MODIFICATIONS
Shannon L. Novey, Esq.
Board Certified in Marital and Family Law
Fellow, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
Tallahassee, FL
ShannonNovey@noveylaw.com
*With special thanks to Kristin Adamson, Ronald H. Kauffma n, Reub en A.
Doupe´, R. T. White, Ashley Myers, Natalie Lemos, and Mark Sessums, who
provided the foundation for these materials and to Sarah F. Carter of Novey +
Gonzalez Family Law, who was instrumen tal in preparing this update.
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SHANNON L. NOVEY
Shannon is a 1999 honors graduate of the Florida State University
College of Law. She has practiced exclusively in marital and family law,
at both the trial and appellate levels for more than 15 years. She previously
practiced in other litigation fields including administrative law,
bankruptcy, and ERISA. She is Board Certified in Marital and Family
Law and a Fellow in the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (currently
Secretary of the Florida Chapter). Shannon has been consistently
recognized by her peers, and by Legal Elite, Super Lawyers, and Best
Lawyers. In 2018 she was named one of Tallahassee’s 25 Women to
Know. Shannon was Tallahassee Family Law “Lawyer of the Year” in
2018 and has been named one of the top 50 women lawyers in Florida by
Super Lawyer since 2019.
Shannon regularly writes and presents about family law topics: she
has served on the Board Certification Review Committee of the Florida
Bar; as an adjunct professor at Florida State University College of Law;
as a mentor and lecturer for the Thunderdome Tallahassee (a project of
the legal aid foundation); and on the Florida Second Judicial Circuit
Grievance Committee. She is an Emeritus of William H. Stafford Inn of
Court, Tallahassee Chapter, American Inns of Court.
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MODIFICATIONS
I. MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY...................................................................................1
A. Jurisdiction...............................................................................................................1
B. Pleadings-Notice-Due Process .................................................................................1
C. Venue .......................................................................................................................2
D. Grounds....................................................................................................................3
E. Substantial Change of Circumstances......................................................................3
Not Contemplated ........................................................................................3
Involuntary...................................................................................................4
Permanent ....................................................................................................6
F. Criteria for Award in Modification Action..............................................................7
G. Modification of Permanent Alimony.......................................................................8
Increased Need of Recipient ........................................................................9
Decreased Need of Recipient.....................................................................10
Diminished Ability to Pay .........................................................................10
Increased Ability to Pay.............................................................................12
H. Modifiability of Lump Sum Alimony....................................................................13
I. Modifiability of Rehabilitative Alimony ...............................................................13
J. Modifiability of Durational Alimony.....................................................................16
K. Modifiability of Nominal Alimony........................................................................16
L. Modifiability of Bridge-The-Gap Alimony ...........................................................17
M. Standards of Proof to Modify Alimony Set by Agreement ...................................17
N. Waiver of Right to Modification............................................................................18
O. Suspension of Alimony Payments .........................................................................20
P. Imputation of Income.............................................................................................20
Q. Retirement..............................................................................................................21
Voluntary Retirement.................................................................................23
Retirement Benefits ...................................................................................23
R. Supportive Relationships .......................................................................................23
S. Retroactive Modification .......................................................................................27
T. Modification of Alimony Arrearages.....................................................................28
II. MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT....................................................................28
A. Jurisdiction .............................................................................................................28
Jurisdiction for Post-Majority Modification ..............................................29
B. Notice/Due Process................................................................................................30
C. Venue .....................................................................................................................32
D. Modification of Foreign Decrees ...........................................................................32
Retroactive Modification of Foreign Child Support Decrees ....................33
E. Grounds for Modification ......................................................................................34
F Statutory Factors for Modifying the Amount ........................................................35
G. Substantial Change in Circumstances....................................................................35
Increased Need Alone ................................................................................36
Age or Emancipation as a Basis for Modification .....................................37
Timesharing as Basis for Modification......................................................38
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H. Involuntary Change v. Voluntary Change .............................................................39
I. Permanent Change .................................................................................................41
J. Burden of Proof in Prior Agreement Cases ...........................................................42
K. Timeframe for Court's Consideration ....................................................................44
L. Retroactive Modification .......................................................................................44
M. Calculation of Support ...........................................................................................46
Health Insurance ........................................................................................47
Social Security Benefits.............................................................................48
N. Waiver of Right to Modification............................................................................48
O. Reduction or Abatement of Child Support Obligation ..........................................49
P. Subsequently Born or Adopted Children...............................................................50
Q. Review of Final Child Suport Orders ....................................................................51
R. Standard of Review on Appeal ..............................................................................51
III. MODIFICATION OF PARENTING PLA NS...............................................................51
A. Jurisdiction and Due Process .................................................................................51
B. Temporary Parenting Plans....................................................................................53
C. Permanent Parenting Plans ....................................................................................53
Burden of Proof..........................................................................................53
Extraordinary Burden.................................................................................54
D. Venue to Modify Parenting Plan............................................................................56
E. Modifying Supervised Timesharing to Unsupervised ...........................................57
F. Enforceability of Foreign Decree of Grandparent Visitation ................................57
G. No Prospective Relocation.....................................................................................58
IV. MODIFICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INJUNCTIONS............................58
A. Burden to Dissolve Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence ...........58
B. Standard of Review................................................................................................60
C. Entitlement to Hearing on Motion to Dissolve if Motion
Legally Sufficient...................................................................................................60
IX. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................................61
I. MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
1. The court entering the support order generall y retains jurisdiction to enforce
the award and to consider modification at any time during the period provided for the support to
be paid. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1994).
2. When Florida has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a support order, it
may act as a responding t ribunal to modify the order. § 88.2061, Florida Statutes.
3. Concerning the enforcement and modification of foreign alimony awards, a
Florida court may enforce, but not modif y, a spousal support order issued by a foreign court which
has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the laws of that state. § 88.2051(6) and
§ 88.2061(3), Fla. Stat.
4. When the party subject to the continuing exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribunal no longer resides in the issuing state, then the tribunal may apply § 88.3181 to receive
assistance from another state with the receipt of evidence and to conduct discovery. § 88.2061(2),
Fla. Stat. Of course, Florida must have acquired personal jurisdiction over the non-resident party
in order to enforce or modify a support order.
B. Pleadings – Notice – Due Process
1. A court cannot modify any judgment unless the issue of modification is
properly p resent ed to it by appropriate proceedings and each party is given an opportunity to be
heard on the issue. Cortina v. C ortina, 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1957). Modification iss ues are properly
presented by a supplemental petition to modify. See Koch v. Koch, 47 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA
2010) (reversing modification absent a supplemental petition for modification); Sabine v. Sabine,
834 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (improper to modif y alimony award during enforcement
action).
2. Pleadings must set forth with enough certainty and specificity allegations
sufficient to inform the adversary of what is proposed to be proved so that he or she has the
opportunity to prepare a defense. Frankel v. Ellerin, 684 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(reversing the trial court ’s dismissal of a petition for modification for failure to set forth the
ultimate facts to support the former wife’s clai m where her petition and amended petition
sufficiently alleg ed a material change in the circumstances warranting an increase in alimony).
The pleader may allege fa ctual theories to support the substantial change in circumstances.
Fischer v. Fischer, 195 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (the trial court further erred in
dismissing the entire multi-count petition based solel y on the former husband’s inability to
establish one of the listed grounds for modification).
3. Any affirmative defense must also be pled or it is waived it unless the
defense is tried by consent. See White v. White, 3 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing where
unclean hands defense not raised in responsive pleading and objected to by opposing cou nsel).
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4. Notice may be by mail, and its sufficiency should be tested by its
reasonableness and by adequacy of opportunity afforded adverse party to be heard and to defend.
Hartley v. Hartley, 134 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) : The husband sought to modify alimony.
Wife received notice of the hearing the day after the hearing occurred; this is insufficient notice.
Wife is entitled to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before decree ma y be modified so
as to directly affect he r person, status, or property.
5. “It is well settled that an order adjudicating issues not presented by the
pleadings, noticed to the parties, or litigated below denies fundamental due process.” Neumann
v. Neumann, 857 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Cortina v. Cortina. 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1957)
(“there can be no doubt that a Chancellor cannot modify a support decree, or any other decree,
unless the iss ue of modification is presented to him in appropriate proceedings and each party is
given an opportunity to be heard on such issue”); Ksaibati v. Ksaibati, 824 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2002). Notice is insufficient notice where the court modi fies for reasons not alleged in the
petition for modification. Mekhaiel v. Messiha, 643 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Ellisen v.
Ellisen, 150 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), the trial court erred by construing the former
husband’s modification petition as a request to terminate only and not modify alimony and
thereby rejecting his request to modi fy where both the modification petition and the pretrial
stipulation put wife and the court on notice that he was seeking modification or termination.
6. Krause v. Krause, 793 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Former wife
challenged the denial of her motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting of former
husband’s Third Supplemental Petiti on for Modification of Alimony. The appellate court found
that the trial court properly denied the former wife’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
appellate court found the alleged changes in the former wife’s ability to pay was sufficient to
petition for a modification of alimony. Further, it was not error for the trial court to consider
evidence of financial hardship due to the former husband’s medical condition and loss of
income.
The former wife argued that these issues were not included in the pleadings and that the trial
court’s consideration of such evidence was a violation of her right to fair notice. The appell ate
court found that when an issue is tried by implied consent, due process concerns are alleviated.
In this case, the former husband’s financial hardship due to his medical condition and loss of
income were tried by consent. Finally, the appellate court found the trial court’s order modifying
alimony was supported by comp etent substantial evidence.
C. Venue
Section 61.14(1), Florida Statutes, also provides the proper venue for bringing
modification actions. They are to be brought in the circuit:
1. In which either of the parties resided at the date of the execution of the
agreement.
2. In which either party resided at the date of the application; or
3. In which the agreement was executed, or in which the order was rendered.
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D. Grounds
Section 61.14(a) generally authorizes modification if the circumstances of a party
or child change. Section 61.08 specifies the circumstances under which various forms of alimony
may be modified or terminated.
In a petition to modify alimony, the moving party must show three fundamental
prerequisites:
1. A substantial change in circumstances. § 61.14(1), Florida Statutes;
Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954).
2. The change was not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of
dissolution. Withers v. Withers, 390 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), rev. den., 399 So. 2d 1147
(Fla. 1981); Dykes v. Dykes, 712 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
3. The change is sufficient, material, involuntary and permanent in nature.
Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992) (superseded in part by § 61.14, Florida Statutes,
regarding burden of proof for modifying obligation set by agreement); Whetstone v. Whetstone,
710 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Hanskat v. Hanskat, 716 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);
Perez v. Perez, 973 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
4. Fischer v. Fischer, 221 So. 3d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) Prerequisites to
alimony obligation: (1) substantial change in circumstances; (2) that the change was not
contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) that the change was
sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature. Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332
(Fla. 2d DCA 2015) Evidence presented at the hearing does not support a finding that the former
husband’s change in circumstance was either unanticipated or involuntary.
E. Substantial Change of Circumstances
An alimony award can only be modified upon a clear showing that there has been
a substantial change in the financial circumstances of either party occurring after the entry of the
order awarding alimony. § 61.14, Florida Statutes; Cleary v. Cleary, 743 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999); Springstead v. Springstead, 717 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Metzler v. Metzler,
356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. den., 370 So. 2d 460. The change in circumstances
must be alleged to have occurred subsequent to the last judgment or order awarding alimony.
Johnson v. Johnson, 537 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Zimerle v. Zimerle, 650 So. 2d 155 (Fla.
1st DCA 1995).
1. Not Contemplated
a. Calahan v. Calahan, 979 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008): Appellate
court remanded the case back to the circuit court where Court failed to make a factual
finding that a decrease in income was not contemplated at the time of divorce.
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b. Dogoda v. Dogoda, 233 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017): The time
to determine wh ether a substantial change in circumstances is anticipated is when an
agreement is signed, not when a Final Judgment is entered.
c. Gelber v. Brydger, 248 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018): The focus
for whether a substantial change has occurred should be on whether the change was
“contemplated and considered” when determining the original award.
d. Pollack v. Pollack, 722 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)- The 5th
DCA affirmed the trial court and found that under circumstances presented, it w as proper
to grant a conversion of rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony. The rehabilitative
alimony award, which was to terminate upon the sale and closing of the home, had been
provided by agreement of the parties; however, at the time of the modi fication action, the
court determined that the former wife was suffering from mental health problems which
could not have been contemplated at the time of the marital settlement agr eement or final
judgment. compare Pettry v. Pettry, 706 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) and Pettry v.
Pettry, 768 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (insufficient evidence to support the former
wife’s claim that mental health problems justified converting her rehabilitative alimony
into permanent alimony where the record showed that the former wife had suffered sim ilar
mental health problems since high school and had anxiety issues dur ing the initial
dissolution proceedings).
e. A change in the tax law, which had the effect of reducing the payor’s
ability to pay and which was anticipated but not ruled on or calculat ed into the alimony
award as it was only speculative at the time of final judgment, could serve as a basis for a
downward modification action. Allison v. Allison, 554 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(the court granted the former husband’s petition for a downward modification of alimony
because the former husband’s income was reduced by the Tax Reform Act, which
practically eliminated his tax shelters and was not anticipated at the time of the entry of the
final judgment, although the former husband was concerned about possible effects at the
final hearing, but the specific effect on his income was not then known).
f. Prospective modifications are generally impermissible
unless
“precisely drawn an d conditioned upon a specifically identified occurrence. ” Rao v. Rao,
501 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
2. Involuntary.
a. The reduction in ability to pay must not be the result of a voluntary
act, and that there was no intent of evading the alimony obligation. Denny v. Denny, 334
So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Pratt v. Pratt, 645 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Where
reduction in ability to pay is brought on by the payor’s failure to pay financial obligations
such as tax debt and past due alimony, despite an increase in income, such reduction in
ability to pay cannot be the basis of a downward modification of alimony.
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b. Pagano v. Hunt, 745 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Tax and
alimony arrearages not involuntary change in circumstances under which alimony could
be modified). See also Cowie v. Cowie, 564 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (alimony may
not be reduced solely because the payor has volunt arily incurred new debt which makes it
difficult to meet the support obligation).
c. Court must apply “good faith” test in determining whether to grant
relief to a payor spouse whose reduction in income is due to a voluntary change of
employment or lifestyl e. First, the court must determine whether the job change was done
intentionally to avoid an alimony obli gation, and second, whether the payor is currently
acting in good faith to increase earnings back to the previous level. McConnell v.
McConnell, 552 So. 2d 2 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (allowing the entry of an order temporarily
reducing alimony payments during such time as necessary for the payor to establish
himself in his new career); Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1956) (establishing the “good
faith” test for reduction of support payments when the paying ex-spouse has changed
employment and suffered a reduction income); Rahn v. Rahn, 768 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2000) (good faith test, while appropriate in actions seeking temporary relief from
support obligation, need not be applied in actions for permanent modificati on of alimony).
d. While the court may grant a temporary suspension or reduction of
alimony if the “good faith test” is met, a petition for modification ma y be denied where the
decreased or inability to pay was voluntary or not permanent. Hanskat v. Hanskat, 716 So.
2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (husband was not entitled to a modification of his alimony
obligation where he had left voluntarily left employment, and while his new business was
not quite earning up to its potential at the time of hearing, the husband expecte d that his
income would eventually return to its prior level, thus, he failed to show a permanent
change in circumstances); Rahn v. Rahn, 768 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (denying
permanent modification of alimony but stating that courts will grant temporary suspension
of alimony when the obligor has suffered a reduction in income without deliberately
seeking to
avoid paying alimony an d is acting in good faith to return the income to its
previous level).
e. Where the payor spouse was acting in good faith to restore ability
after experiencing an involuntary, permanent, and substantial loss of income or assets, but
could not restore ability to pay after diligent efforts, the downward petition for modi fication
may be granted. Laliberte v. Laliberte, 698 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (no error to
reduce support obligation where former husband was phased out of his medical practice
and then purchased a medical practice that did not work out, where he acted in good faith
trying to meet his financial obligations and continue working in his field, but it did not
appear he was going to be successful in the near future).
f. Reep v. Reep, 565 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) Participation in a
legal strike is grounds for modification, while participation in an illegal strike is a voluntary
reduction in income.
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g. Waskin v. Waskin, 484 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986): Adverse
impact on former husband’s income resulting from publicity and expenses of defending
himself from criminal charges did not justify reduction in alimony obligation.
h. Regan v. Regan, 217 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). The former
husband petitioned to modif y the agreed upon alimony amount of $9,000 per month
downward base d upon the former wife ’s voluntary decrease of expenses by half. The trial
court granted the modification and appellate court affirmed. Howev er, the dissent
distinguishes bet ween agreements v. court determined alimony awards. The dissent would
hold that a volunt ary reduction in an alimony receiving spouse’s standard of living is not
grounds for reducing an agreed alimony award, reasoning, “there was no savings
component in the original alimony award as agreed, that the husband should not benefit
because the wife has chosen to spend her money differently after the divorce than she did
prior to the divorce, and that to hold otherwise creates a disincentive for an alimony
receiving spouse to save for his or her old age or for health care expenses, sometimes
holding back on expenditures in the present to make sure resources will be available in the
future.”
i. Gibbs v. Gibbs, 320 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) No error in
denying former husband’s petition for modification of alimony by finding his inability to
pay was not involuntary and permanent. Timing of former husband’s transfer of assets and
sales proceeds support trial court’s finding that former husband purposefully shielded
assets and shirked his alimony obligations. Burden of proof on former husband.
3. Permanent
a. Alimony should be modified upon a showing of a substantial
involuntary and permanent change of financial circumstances. Levin v. Levin , 613 So. 2d
556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (payor’s income dropped from $80,000 to $13,000 and it had
maintained at that level for two years). Showin g a subst antial change exi sted for one ye ar
or more is general ly a showing of sufficient permanence to grant relief; however, in some
situations, the permanency of the change can be proved immediately. Bennett v. Dept. of
Revenue , 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
b. Where a former husband’s employment income had steadily
declined, and income decreased from $250,000 to $114,000 to $87,000 until he was
terminated, the $1,000 increase in income over the past two months from the new business
was not enough to overcome the presumption of permanency where the obligor’s severe
loss of income persisted for over a year with no end in sight. Perez, supra.[please note
that a procedural issue here contributed to reversal].
c. Husband’s change in circumstances was permanent when evidence
showed that it had been reduced substantially for more than two years and fluctuated from
month to month. Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
d. Sjogren v. Sjogren, 309 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) – Although
husband’s decrease in pay was involuntary due to increased deductions by his current
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employer, it was not permanent and therefore he was onl y entitled to a temporary
modification and not a permanent one.
F. Criteria for Award in Modification Action
Effective August 25, 2022, the Florida Supreme Court has amended Rule 12.530,
Fla. Fam. L.R.P. to require a Moti on for Rehearing to preserve an objection as to insufficient
findings in a final order.
1. A trial court’s failure to make specific factual findings with regard to
alimony ‘may preclude meaningful appellate review and result in a case having to be r eve rsed and
remanded.” Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (quoting Walsh v. Walsh, 600
So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)). First, the court failed to make any findings regarding the parties’
standard of living during the marriage. Second, the court failed to make specific findings regarding
the former wife’s financial resources. Third, while the court found that the former husband’s
income had doubled since entry of the original final judgment, the cou rt failed to make any findings
regarding the significant increase in the former husband’s assets. Finally, the court failed to make
any findings regarding the tax implications of the alimony award. See Farley v. Farley, 858 So. 2d
1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Because the trial court made no specific f actual findings that would
support its $3,700 alimo ny award, we reverse the alimony award and remand for further
proceedings.
2. The alimony awarded by the last final decree is effective until it is modified
by a court order, and the court cannot award temporary alimony in a modification proceeding or
any post-dissolution hearing, prior to a final hearing on the issue of modification. Saulnier v.
Saulnier, 425 S o. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); however, the modified award of alimony may be
made effective retroactive from the date that the petition for modification was filed. Robbie v.
Robbie, 726 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
3. The court cannot enter temporary modification of alimony pending the
outcome of a supplemental petition for modification since the initial award is the law of the case
until determined otherwise. Levinson v Levinson, 895 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
4. Generally, increases in the payor’s income alone will not justify
modification without a showing of an increase in the payee’s needs. Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d
429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984 ), rev. d en., 459 So. 2d 1040.
5. Proof of a substantial change in financial circumstances of “either party”
may properly support a modification of alimony, but the court is not required to modify alimony
just becau se the ability to pay has changed or just because the need of the recipient has changed,
but ma y look at the equitable circumstances, and modify the alimony only if equity so dictates.
Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991).
6. The amount of alimony awarded in a final judgment of modification must
be based on both the needs of the payee and the payor’s ability to pay, just as it is in an original
order. Eyster v. Eyster, 503 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. den., 513 So. 2d 1061; Walton
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v. Walton, 537 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla.
1st DCA 1989).
7. Error to fail to modify alimony where the wife has shown increased needs
on her part, and the increased ability to pay on the part of husband. Brown v. Brown, 629 So. 2d
1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994 ); Kartzmark v. Kartzmark, 709 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
8. Eisemann v. Eisemann, 5 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Wife sought
modification of alimony The court entered order increasing husband’s alimony and ordering him
to pay wife’s attorney fees. Husband appealed. The upward modification of alimony could not be
based upon the unmet needs of wife at the time of original award, unless, as in Bedell v. Bedell,
583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991), the “trial court was legally required to award an amount of alimony
which did not meet the needs of the recipient spouse (due to the then-existing financial inability
of the paying spouse to meet those needs).” The final judgment modifying alimony was reversed
and remanded for reconsideration in light of the wife’s current unmet needs.
9. It is improper to order an automatic downward modification of alimony
based on some anticipated future event, and the court could not consider the wife’s entitlement to
a retirement account at the age of 62 as a stream of income to her in support of future alimony
reduction where the retirement accounts were distributed to her as part of equitable distributi on
and could not also be used as a source of alimony. Furthermore, there was no evidence as to the
wife’s needs at age 62. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 640 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ; Antonini v.
Antonini, 473 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ; Bacon v. Bacon, 956 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA
2007) .
10. Sale of the marital home by the former wife was a substantial change in
circumstances that warranted modification of alimony as the former wife’s needs had changed.
This was true even though the former wife used the proceeds from the sale to make a down-
payment on a home with a 15-year mortgage, such that her mortgage payment remained the same
(even though she could have paid for the house without a mortgage). Ultimately, the former wife’s
use of her alimony award to pay down a mortgage over the 15-year period was viewed as a form
of savings, not considered appropriate by the court. Reaffirmed wife’s assets from equitable
distribution need to be evaluated in determining an award of alimony. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 953 So. 2d
632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
11. Error to reduce alimony without showing a substantial and permanent
change in the fo rmer wife’s economic circumstances. The trial court redu ce d alimony b ased on the
lower cost of living in Eg ypt, although there was no showing that the wife’s move to Egypt was
permanent, and the move to Egypt had not been alleged in the petition as a basis for the
modification. Mekhaiel v. Messiha, 643 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
G. Modification of Permanen t Alimony
1. The purpose of permanent periodic alimony was to provide for the needs
and necessities of life for a former spouse as they were established during the marriage of the
parties. Permanent periodic alimony is alwa ys subject to modification unless the right is
specifically waived by the parties. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
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Modification of permanent alimony depends on proof of a subst antial change of circumstances
affecting the need of one part y and/or the ability to pay of the other party. The automatic reduction
of permanent alimony is impermissible; gen erally, it is error to provide for an automatic future
change or termination of alimony based upon the anticipated occurrence of a future event;
however, such an auto matic reduction would not be improper where the evidence supports a
finding that the receiving spouse’s financial positi on will in fact change in the future. Loss v. Loss ,
714 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Hitt v. Hitt, 571 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
2. Generally, it is error to provide for an automatic, future change in alimony;
however, where the evidence is cl ear that the receiving spouse’s financial position will change in
the future, the court may order an automatic future reduction in alimony. Loss v. Loss, 714 So. 2d
1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (proper to provide for an automatic reduction in alimony in the amount
of the former wife’s monthly mortgage payment, to begin one month after the final payment of
that mortgage).
3. Orders which automatically increase or reduce an alimony award when the
child or children reach majority without the requisite showing of an increase or decrease in need
are impermissible. Swanston v. Swanston, 746 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that the
wife was not entitled to an automatic increase in alimony when the child reaches majority); see
also Anderson v. Anderson, 155 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Error to include in order redu cing
the former husband’s alimony a provision for the alimony obligation to revert to pre-modification
amount conditioned solely upon the p arties’ relative incomes returning to what they were at the
time of the 2000 final judgment.
“Where the court makes a finding that the party e ntitled to receive alimony
has financial needs greater than the financial ability of the spouse to pay, it
would be appropriate for the court to find what the actual alimony needs are
and then reserve jurisdiction to increase payments if the spouse’s ability to
pay increas e s.” Stewart v. Stewart, 976 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
(citing, Llopis v. Llopis, 731 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999)).
4. Increased Need of Re cipient
a. Generally, an increase in the needs of the recipient spouse may
justify modification of alimony so long as the pa yor has the financial ability. Kaufman v.
Kaufman, 541 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that the obligee spouse did not
need to deplete their capital assets in order to maintain a standard of living); England v.
England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (alimon y should not be increased, absent
proof of an increased need for support and the other spouse’s ability to meet that increased
obligation).
b. Where the increased needs of the recipient are being met through the
generosity of family or friends, it cannot be argued that his or her needs have not increased
so as to support an increase in alimony. Gardner v. Gardner, 692 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA
1997)
10
c. A dramatic increase in the price of a home does not constitute a
substantial change in circumstances in support of a request for upward modification when
the agreement contemplated the subsequent sale of the home. Damiano v. Damiano, 855
So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (former wife was unable to show that her increased cost
for housing caused her monthly needs to increase).
5. Decreased Need of Recip ient
a. Absent a marital settlement agreement to the contrary, the former
wife’s current employability can be considered by the trial court in deciding whether to
modify permanent alimony or convert to rehabilitative alimony, even if employability was
considered at the time of the initial award. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997).
b. At the time of the final hearing of dissolution of marriage, the wife
was a co-tenant of funds in joint accounts with her mother, and she testified that she was
not entitled to the funds during the life of her mother but would inherit them upon the
mother’s demise. Therefore, it was an unanticipated and substantial change of
circumstances when the former wife actuall y received her inheritance post-dissolution, so
that termination of alimony w as justified. Selembo v. Selembo, 591 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1992); Brock v. Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (actual receipt of
expect ed inheritance is a substantial change in circumstances).
c. Trial court has jurisdiction to modify the medical insurance
provision of the settlement agreement incorporated into the Final Judgment of Dissolution
of Marriage, where it appeared to be a part of the support provision, especially in light of
the fac t that the husband had not objected when he was held in conte mpt for non-
compliance with the provision. Mackay v. Mechetti, 695 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(substantial change of circumst ances was demonstrated when the wife alleged that she had
developed cancer and had an increased need for insurance).
d. An unexpected deterioration in the recipient spouse’s medical
condition which increases the needs for support may serve as a justification for an alimony
modification. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 536 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Bovet v. Bovet,
563 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
e. Valby v. Valby, 317 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) Trial court did
not abuse its disc retion in changing permanent alimony to durational after finding that wife
obtaining full-time employment was substantial change in circumstances not contemplated
by pa rties even though durational alimon y did not exist at time of final judgment.
6. Diminished Ability to Pay
a. Former husband was entitled to a greater reduction in his alimony
obligation where his income had reduced 56% through no fault of his own, and the evidence
revealed that the assets the wife received as equitable distribution had increased in value
substantially, and upon conservative investment she could earn an income of
11
approximately $25,000 per year in addition to her salary. Dippold v. Dippold, 712 So. 2d
1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
b. Where the former wife’s income increased due to her receipt of
proceeds from the sale of stock, the former husband moved for a downward modification
of alimony. Modi fication by the trial court was error because the former husband’s income
had increased significantly since the entry of the final judgment of dissolution and was a
greater amount than the former wife’s, and because the former wife demonstrated that she
still needed the full amount of alimony awarded in order to maintain the standard of living
during the marriage. Webb v. Webb, 659 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
c. The effect of inflation on an original alimon y award may be
considered by th e trial court in a petition for alimony modification. Rosen v. Rosen, 528
So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), rev. den ., 537 So. 2d 569; see also Waldman v. Waldman,
520 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (it should be demonstrated how the inflation specifically
impacts on the individual); England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (court
took judicial notice of the cost of living increase); Emmel v. Emmel, 671 S o. 2d 282 (Fla.
5th DCA 1996) (increase in the cost of living alone will not justify an increase in alimony
if the o verall economic circumstances of a party have not deteriorated).When determining
whether the former wife was entitled to an increase in alimony due to the increased need
caused by inflation, the court should have considered the eff ect of the former wife’s n ew
income on her needs. Becker v. Becker, 720 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Former wife
was not entitl ed to an increase in alimony based on inflation where she failed to prove that
inflation impaired her ability to support herself. Hillier v. Iglesias, 901 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2005).
d. Showing a reduction in the payor spouse’s income alone will not
justify modific ation of an alimony award. The payor’s present inability to pay as a whole
must be shown. Schaefer v. Schaefer, 344 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Emmel v.
Emmel, 671 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1996) (no reduction in alimony was justified by the
decline in the husband’s tool business income where the final judgment had noted that
money from the tool business was not to be relied upon for alimon y); Nowell v. Nowell,
634 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (husband had not proved a permanent, substantial and
material change of circumstances in support of his request for a downward modification of
permanent alimony).
e. Although the husband had demonstrated a substantial change in
circumstances such that the former husband’s inco me no longer met his expenses, the trial
court acted within its discretion in considering that the former wife had no other source of
income and reducing rather than eliminating alimony. Albu v. Albu, 150 So. 3d 1226 (Fla.
4th DCA 2014).
f. In vacating an order of zero alimony payment and remanding for
entry of a nominal award of permanent alimony, the First DCA held that a nominal award
of permanent alimony, instead of reducing the payment to zero with a retention of
jurisdiction, better preserves the trial court’s jurisdiction to revisit the matter in the future
12
upon a change of the parties’ circumstances. Donovan v. Donovan, 200 So. 3d 275 (Fla.
1st DCA 2016).
g. Former husband sou ght modification of his alimony obligation due
to his becoming permanently disabled after entry of the final judgment. The trial court
denied the petition and the appellate court affirmed. The dissolution judgment provided
that former husband’s alimony obligation was non-modifiable for a certain period of time
unless he became permanently disabled “as det ermined by a physician or the Social
Security Administration.” The trial court found none of the medical records upon which
former husband relied on stated that he was permanently disabled. Additi onally, the former
husband did not file for Social S ecurity disability as a result of his condition. McDaniels v.
McDaniels, 278 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
7. Increased Ability to Pay
a. Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991): A substantial increase
in the financial ability of the paying spouse, stand ing alone, may be justified but does not
require an increase in alimon y. The supreme court in Bedell stated, “In fact, we would
expect that a raise in alimony would be ordered when no increased need was shown onl y
in extraordinary cases where equitable considerations were particularly compelling.” See
also Shafer v. Shafer , 777 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(trial court denied the former
wife’s petition for an upward modification of permanent periodic alimony where the
former wife showed the former husband’s significant increase in income, but failed to
prove any substantial or material change in her needs; it was properly within the trial
court’s discretion to deny the former wife’s petition based on its ruling that the former
husband’s increased income alone was insufficient to modify alimony in th at case).
b. Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992):
denial of increase in alimony is required where the wife fails to show that her needs were
not met by the prior alimony award. See also Linstroth v. Dorgan, 2 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008) (there was no abuse of discretion in increasing alimony when the former
husband’s income increased dramatically, enabling him to pay alimony sufficient to meet
the needs of the former wife, who had been living at subsistence level).
c. The need for additional alimony must be determined based on the
prior standard of living during the marriage, regardless of the post-dissolution increase in
the financial ability of the payor spouse. Szuri v. Szuri, 759 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000)Error! Bookmark not defined. (payor’s ability to pay had increased 20 years after
the dissolution, but the needs of the payee were not shown to have in creased based on the
standard of living at the time of the dissolution).
d. A substantial increase in ability to pay is sufficient grounds to
petition for a modification of alimony in cases where the needs of the recip ient had not
been met by the original alimony award, such as when the payor was temporarily earning
less at the time of the final hearing than he or she would be earning upon the completion
of schooling or
training being pursued. See Arce v. Arce, 566 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 3d DCA
13
1990); Schlesinger v. Emmons, 566 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (former husband’s
receipt of an inheritance created a substantial change of circumstances and was sufficient
in itself to support an increase in alimony where the needs of the wife had not b een met in
the initial award); Zipperer v. Zipperer, 567 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (increased
income justified an upward modific ation where the former wife could not afford to live
according to the standard of living established in the long-term marriage).
e. Former husband filed petition to modify alimony downwards. Trial
court reduced the former husband’s alimony obligation by 85% to $1,819.19 from
$12,000.00 per month. The trial court also ordered the former wife to pay him back nearly
$400,000 in retroactive alimony. The appell ate c ourt reversed as the trial court erred in
viewing the case entirely from the former wife’s current standard of living. The record
demonstrated that the parties owned two airplanes, multiple residences, traveled
extensively, and did not l ive on a budget during the marriage. That was the lifestyle to be
considered in determining former wife’s standard of living. Former wife lived a more
modest lifestyle since the parties’ divorce. The trial court effectively punished the former
wife for her decision to live a more modest lifestyle than that during the marriage, and that
currently enjoyed by former husband. While some modification based on decreased needs
is appropriate, an 85% reduction in alimony dramatically altered the lands cape of former
wife’s marital standard of living. Dunn v. Dunn, 277 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).
f. Judy v. Judy, 291 So. 3d 651 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2020), Trial Court
improperly imputed income to wife in a downward modification when the original MSA
did not contemplate or require the wife to seek employment.
8. The financial status of a successor spouse is ordinarily irrel evant. An
except ion exists if it is demonstrated that a party owing alimony has deliberately limited his or her
income for the purpose of reducing the alimony obligation and is living off the income of a
successor spouse. Vega v. Swait, 961 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
H. Modifiability of Lump Sum Alimony
Lump-sum alimony is not modifiable unless jurisdiction is expressly retained for
such purpose by agreement of the parties. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980);
Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 ( Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Rentz v. Rentz, 535 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1988) (lump-sum alim ony was not modifiabl e absent agreement of the parties). The manner
of its payment, however, may be modified. Miller v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984),
rev. den., 462 So. 2d 1107.
I. Modifiability of Rehabilitative Alimony
1. Rehabilitative alimony is subject to modification or termination. Pujals v.
Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), but the request must be made before the rehabilitative
period expires. Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d
77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Termination of rehabilitative alimony is proper onl y when there are
findings that due to a material change in circumstances since the original decre e, either the
recipient no longer ne eds the assistance of rehabilitative alimony, or the payor lacks the abilit y to
14
pay. Weiser v. Weiser, 657 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Vaccato v. Pustizzi, 648 So. 2d 1206
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995). An award of rehabilitative alimony may be converted to permanent alimony
under appropriate circumstances. Yohem v. Yohem, 324 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
2. The purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to allow a spouse to obtain a skil l,
education, or rehabilitation in order to adjust to a new life. Brock v. Brock, 682 So. 2d 682 (Fla.
5th DCA 1996). Rehabilitative alimony is for a time certain or until a specific goal has been met.
Berki v. Berki, 636 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 645 So. 2d 450 (Fla.1994);
Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). If, through no fault of the petitioner,
the goal is not met, the rehabilitative alimony ma y be extended. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410 So. 2d
1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) ; however, a petitioner seeking an extension of rehabilitative alimony
must show that rehabilitation did not occur despite reasonable and diligent efforts. Wilson v.
Wilson, 585 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
3. Trial Court must make specific findings as to goals of and projected period
of time needed to comple te a rehabilitative plan. plan. Allison v. Allison, 692 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997); Wetzel v. Wetzel, 671 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Collingsworth v.
Collingsworth, 624 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
4. It is not required that a party make a showing of substantial effort to
rehabilitate hers elf in order to obtain modification or extension of rehabilitative alimony;
however, wife’s burden is to show that despite her diligent and reasonable efforts she has not been
rehabilitated. Mann v. Mann, 523 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). See also Brock v. Brock, 682
So. 2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
5. A rehabilitative alimony award payable over a period of time may be
modified at any time during the term of the rehabilitative period. Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d 77
(Fla. 4th DCA 1994). A request for a modification of rehabilitative alimony
can be filed until the
end of the rehabilitative period and not necessarily before the last payment is made. Hybart v.
Hybart, 638 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Cohen v. Cohen, 637 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994).
6. To entitle the obligee to modification of rehabilitative alimony (either by
extension or conversion) into permanent periodic alimony, the spouse must show not onl y a change
of circumstances, but that due to no fault of the recipient, the rehabilitative plan did not work out.
Saez-Ortiz v. Saez-Ortiz, 560 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (court should consider the spouse’s
progress towards achi eving financial independence, the spouse’s heal th, any disabilities, the
market for the spouse’s skills, and whether additional training is needed, when determining
whether rehabilitation has occurred. Pollack v. Pollack, 722 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
7. No allegation of increased need is necessary when petitioning to extend
alimony because the termination of payments, in and of itself, constitutes a change in
circumstances. Reid v. Reid, 396 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Blumberg v. Blumberg, 561 So.
2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 19 89).
15
8. Modification is not appropriate where the former wife received
rehabilitative alimony and accomplished rehabilitation. The former husband sought a reduction in
alimony based on the former wife’s increased income. Be cause the former wife’s rehabilitation
was anticipated, modification was denied. Yangco v. Yangco, 901 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
9. Self-support, in a rehabilitative alimony context, means more than obtaining
a job and an “income.” A divorced person is entitled to live in a manner reasonably commensurate
with the standard established by the husband during the course of a long -ter m marriage. Paulsen
v. Paulsen, 603 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (where the trial court has fashioned a complicated
and lengthy rehabilitative plan suited to the particular needs of the party, the court is entitled to
monitor the progress of that plan and make ne cessary adjustments to it whenever a party is able to
show a material discrepancy between the rehabilitative progress the court anticipated and the
degree of rehabilitation actually achieved by the recipient spouse).
10. The court must consider the recipient’s ability to achieve the marital
standard of living as the goal of rehabilitation. The fact that the wife would or could have properly
been awarded permanent periodic alimony should be considered in a petition for modi fication of
rehabilitative alimony, because the wife should not have to waste her assets to maintain her
standard of living while she is willing to mak e a good faith effort to become self-supporting.
O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (rehabilitative alimony cannot be
converted to permanent alimony simply because the trial judge believed that it was error to have
awarded rehabilitative in the first place inasmuch as permanent alimony would have been more
appropriate; rather, the court should have applied the proper modification principles).
11. The trial court must give payee time to actual ly obtain a job after
rehabilitation occurs before terminating alimony. Stewart v. Rich, 664 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996) (Wife obtained law degree but had not yet obtained employment when alimony terminated).
12. Where rehabilitative alimony is awarded for the purpose of attaining a
professional degree (and that is accomplished), and the recipient becomes employed in that field,
then the goal of rehabilitative alimony is met. Pettry
v. Pettry, 768 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
13. Wh en considering a petition for conversion of rehabilitative alimony to
permanent alimony, the court should not simply apply the substantial change of circumstances test,
but should consider the original purpose of the award, whether it has been achieved, and if not, the
reasonable likelihood of the recipient becoming self-supporting under the present circumstances
and whether recipient had made diligent efforts to become rehabilitated. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410
So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Saez-Ortiz v. Saez-Ortiz, 560 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990);
Tonnelier v. T onnelier, 571 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). However, where the trial court abused
its discretion in sua sponte converting periodic rehabilitative alimony payments provided for in
the parties’ agreement into one lump-sum payment, which thereby foreclosed the recipient’s ability
to modify the alimony, if needed, within the 18-month period previously afforded to that party.
Bovet v. Bovet, 563 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Where the final judgment provided that the
award of lump-sum alimony precluded, and was in lieu of, permanent alimony, the former wife
was barred from seeking a conversion of rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony, ev en
though, d espite he r diligent efforts, she had not attained self-support. Farrior v. Farrior, 488 S o.
2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Sim ilarly, it is improper to grant conversion of rehabilitative alimony
16
to permanent alimony where the wife is making progress in rehabilitation and the rehabilitative
period is only half-way over. Paulsen v. Paulsen, 603 S o. 2d 1317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
14. The trial court erred by extending the rehabilitative period when the initial
goal of rehabilitation had already been met, and the former wife had obtained her nursing degree
and located avail able jobs but had changed her mind about working as a nurse and wanted to
further her education in order to obtain a medical records degree. Wilson v. Wilson, 585 So. 2d
1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (since a rehabilitative alimony award is merely a projection based upon
certain assumptions and probabilities which are expected to be fulfilled within a certain time period
and resulting in the self-support of the recipient, in order to extend or convert the rehabilitative
alimony to permanent alimony, he or she must show why the court’s original assumptions were
defective and why the situation did not work out) (citing O’Neal v. O’Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla.
5th DCA 1982).
15. Error to extend rehabilitative alimony without specifying a definite period
for the support. Roth v. Roth, 615 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (court found that the former
wife continued to need rehabilitative alimony until she graduated and was able to become
established in a job, but it improperl y failed to limit the time for the former wife to accomplish this
goal).
16. A payor’s motion to dismiss was properly denied where there was no
specific cut-off period for the rehabilitative alimony. Also, it was an abuse of discretion to fail to
convert to permanent alimony given the wife ’s health problems. Hall v. Hall, 598 So. 2d 297 (Fla.
1st DCA 1992).
J. Modifiability of Durational Alimony
1. Section 61.08(7), Florida Statutes (2018) provides that the amount of an
award of durational alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in
circumstances in accord with Section 61.14, Florida Statutes. However, the length of an award of
durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not
exceed the length of the marriage.
2. Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018): By agreement, the
parties created an alimony obligation that would terminate when the former husband reached age
sixty-two. However, this agreemen t predated “durational alimony” as created by the Florida
statutes. Before the former husband turned 62, the former wife filed a modification action to
extend the alimony beyond the former husband’s 62
nd
birthday. The Fifth DCA found that the trial
court h ad subject matter jurisdiction to make this modification because it was filed in the same
court that had ordered the alimony originally. A specific “reservation of jurisdiction” to modi fy
is not mandatory. So long as the action was filed before alimony expired, it was timely filed. For
durational awards that p receded the “durational alimony” statute, circuit courts have the authority
to modify the duration of agreed-upon alimony payments upon a showing of a change in
circumstances.
K. Modifiability of Nominal Alimony
17
1. Nominal alimony may be awar ded when the court finds the requisite
entitlement to alimony, but due to insufficient resources available at the ti me of final hearing, it
cannot award sufficient alimony to meet the needs of the payee. The nominal award reserves
jurisdiction for the court to later modify the amount of alimony upon petition of the payee, should
the financial conditions of the payo r spouse improve. Ellis v. Ellis, 699 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA
1997) (award of $1.00 in permanent alimony to wife in order to leave open the possibility of
increasing the alimony should the value of the husband’s pension increas e, since husband could
then pay increased alimony from his Social Security disability income currently being used for his
own support); Da vis v. Davis, 691 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Strysick v. Strysick, 673 So.
2d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Rogers v. Rogers, 746 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); see also
Stewart v. Stewart, 976 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ( trial court should not have reserved
jurisdiction for any increases in alimony without the necessary proof of a substantial change in
circumstance when the husband had the ability to pay more than the amount of alimony actually
awarded).
2. Alimony may also be reduced to a nominal amount. Husband was a law yer
who lost his job and was unable to find comparable work. The court found it sufficient to reduce
alimony to a nominal amount. In the event his income from his private practice increases, then
alimony may be restored. Brewer v. Brewer, 898 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
L. Modifiability of Bridge-The-Gap Alimony
Bridge-the-Gap Alimony is lump-sum alimony paid in installments to help one
spouse adjust financially to li fe after marriage. See Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1999). This type of alimony is generally awarded after a short-term marriage in order to
allow a spouse to bridge the gap between the high standard of living enjoyed during the brief
marriage and the more modest standard of single life. See Landow v. Landow, 824 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
4th DCA 2002). P ursuant to Athey v. Athey, 849 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), bridge the gap
alimony is non-modifiable lump-sum alimony, which is not extinguished upon the deat h of the
payor.
M. Standards of Proof to Modify Alimony Set by Agreement
1. Prior to the 1993 amendment to § 61.14, Florida Statutes, which states, “the
proof required to modify a settlement agreement and the proof required to modify an award
established by court order shall be the same,” it had been generally held that there was a heavier
burden of proof to modify support that was provided for by agreement, rather than it being rested
on the party seeking a modification of a court ordered alimony award. See Pimm v. Pimm, 601
So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992). Today, the burden of proving modification is the same under both
circumstances. Pratt v. Pratt , 645 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
2. Joyce v. Joyce, 563 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) articulates the general
rule that pure property settlement agreements are non-modifiable absent consent of the parties.
The test for determining whether periodic payments constitute support or a methodology for a
division of property is whether the payor spouse’s pa yments were intended to be given in exchange
for some property interest or right of the recipient spouse. See also Robinson v. Robinson, 647 So.
2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Ray v. Ray, 707 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
18
3. Where the agreement refers to the monetary award as alimony and the
agreement contemplates a modification thereof, it is not a pure property settlement agreem ent and
is therefore subject to modification. Draper v. Draper, 604 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
4. In cases where the payments are not termed “alimony,” the court may look
at other factors to determine whether the intent and purpose of the payments are considered a
property settlement or support. The provision for termination of payments upon marriage, the
modifiability of the payments, and the treatment of the payments for tax purposes, are several of
these factors. Kidd v. Kidd, 695 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4t h DCA 1997) (alimony provision for payments
enduring ten (10) years which are terminable upon death or remarriage was found to be subject to
modification, particularly where parties treated provision as alimony for tax purposes). See also
Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So. 2d. 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (marital settlement agreement provided
for monthly payments for 10 years, terminable upon wife’s remarriage, but they wer e not called
alimony. Nonetheless, the appellate court determined that the payments were periodic alimony
and not lump-sum alimony, and could be modified by the court to be converted to permanent
periodic alimony); Ray v. Ray, 707 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (agreement referred to periodic
payments to wife until such time as the marital home sold or was refinanced as a “salary.”
However, the court determined that the payments were in the nature of support and the provision
was separable from the property settlement, and thus, modifiable by the court).
5. Where the wife w as receiving payments from the husband’s military
retirement benefits, but the final judgment specifically found that there was no entitlement to
alimony, the trial court correctly denied the former wife’s request to modify payments, finding that
payments were non-modifiable property distributions, not alimony. Hulse v. Hulse, 873 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
6. Alimony provided for pursuant to a post-nuptial agreement. The court
required to follow the terms of modification set forth in th e parties’ post-nuptial agreement.
Ferraro v. Ferraro, 891 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
N. Waiver of Right to Modification
1. The statutory right to modify support applies to all support obligations,
whether court determined or agree d in a settlement agreement. § 61.14, Fla. Stat. Such a right
exists unless it is waived. Thus, failing to mention the right to modification in a settlement does
not prohibit a future modification of support, i.e., there can be no “implied waiver” due to the
absence of lan guage that explicitly makes the obligation modifiable. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 199
So. 3d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
2. The right to alimon y and the right to modi fication may be waived by
agreement of the parties. Turner v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. den., 392
So. 2d 1381; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 499 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (language of
agreement evinced cl ear intention that the provision for alimony in the agreement would be
controlling and could only be modified as authorized by agreement); Mackaravitz v. Mackaravitz,
710 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (an award of lump -sum alimony was impermissible
modification of the parties’ antenuptial agreement in which the parties had specifically waived any
19
right to alimony); Snedaker v. Snedaker, 660 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (antenuptial
agreement provision setting alimony for the wife specifically stated that the spouses waived all
rights to receive further alimony, support or maintenance pa yments, thus, the wife was precluded
from seeking a modification of support).
3. Parties can waive their right to modify alimony, and any subsequent
changes, however unanticipated an d devastating, cannot justify a modification of the alimony that
has been established by agreement that contained an irrevocable waiver of any modification.
Agliano v. Agliano, 605 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Mackaravitz v. Mackaravitz, 710 So. 2d
57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
4. A waiver of the right to modify is not modifiable. See Kuchera v. K uchera,
983 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), in which the court focused on the “waiver” language in the
Marital Settlement Agreement. The Agreement had a “no modification” clause, which the court
found governed rights and obligations upon dissolution in a proceeding filed 11-years after
reconciliation.
5. Error to find that a provision for alimony in a Marital Settlement Agreement
is non-modifiable where the agreement denominated payments as permanent periodic alimony
payments were not to be made in exchange for any property rights, and factors, in support of
permanent alimony, such as length of marriage and wife’s contribution, were cited in agreement.
Pratt v. Pratt, 645 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
6. Florida recognizes the parties’ right to contract away the right to seek
modification of alimony awards, but a “General Release” does not bar modification of alimony, as
the right to modification depends on future change of circumstances not a cause of action or claim
either party had at the time of the agreement. Vargas v. Vargas, 654 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995); Emmel v. Emmel, 671 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (agreement did not clearly ex press
that provisions were not modifiable.); Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
(where parties’ original agreement contained only a broad waive r of the right to seek judicial
modification of the agreement, and provided that it could only be modified by written agreement
of the parties, but did not express any specific waiver of
right to seek a modification of alimony,
and in fact did not mention alimony at all, modification by the court w as permitted).
7. Waiver of the right to modify alimony must be specificall y expressed by
clear language enforcing an intent to waive all such rights in the future. Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So.
2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Sasnett v. Sasnett, 683 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Rosenthal
v. Rosenthal, 199 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA
2018).
8. Pursuant to the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement, incorporated into the
Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, the alimony is not modifiable at all at the request of
the former husband, and the alimony is modifiable at the request of the former wife only if the
former husband is in default. Such an agreement is valid and enforceable. Brito v. Brito, 804 So.
2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
20
O. Suspension of Alimony Payments
1. Where the payor lacks the present ability to pay through no fault of his or
her own, the payor should not be subjected to the accrual of arrearages. If unemployment is
involuntary and temporar y in nature (less than one yea r), such a situation would not meet the
standard of a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. However, if the payor
demonstrates that, at least temporarily, he or she lacks the ability to pay, the court should suspend
the payment obligation (r ather than modify). Bennett v. Dept. of Revenue, 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1995). This is especially true where the evidence supports a finding that the payor is
diligently seeking re-employment so that the unemployment should most likely be temporary. See
also Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (it is proper to temporarily suspend or reduce
a support obligation when the p ayor is involuntar ily forced to retire and is making a good faith
effort to become re-employed); Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Ronan v. Ronan,
621 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
2. It is error to permanently reduce alimony where a permanent reduction in
income is not proven; ho wever, if requested, temporary relief may be granted upon a showing of
a temporary change of circumstance. Gardiner v. Gardiner, 705 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
(husband had testified that his involuntary unemployment was not permanent, and he expected to
be rehired. Thus, he was not entitled to have the alimony modified but was entitled to have the
payments suspended during the current period of his unemployment); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 710
So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
P. Imputation of Income
1. Court cannot impute income unless there is a finding that the payor is
earning less than he could, based on a showing that the payor is employable or that he has the
capability of earning more by using his best e fforts. In this case, the payor became completely
disabled. Therefore, alimony should have been termi nated. Gruber v. Gruber, 857 So. 2d 329 (Fla .
2d DCA 2003); Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
2. The business income from a medical practice used to pay down a building
mortgage on a different corporation owned by the former husband must be included as available
income for purposes of calculating his ability to pay. Yangco v. Yangco, 901 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2005).
3. The trial court erred in failing to impute to the former wife income for
earnings that could reasonably be projected based on her liquid assets while imputing the same
type of income to the former husband in a modification action. Winnier v. Winnier, 163 So. 3d
1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
4. When husband only pled for downward modification based on wife’s
reduced expenses and did not plead for imputation of income or use of income to defray her
expenses as grounds for reducing his alimony obligation and the use of income from her assets
was not contemplated in the parties’ MSA, the court declined to impute income to former wife
based upon a plan of early withdrawal from her retirement accounts under the Internal Revenue
21
Code, section 72t (2013); however, the court did reduce the alimony award based upon recipient
former wife’s voluntary reduction of expenses post-divorce. Regan v. Regan, 217 So. 3d 91 (Fla.
4th DCA 2017).
5. It is reversable er ror to impute unapplied for social security benefits as
income to a recipient spouse when the ev idence shows that the social security benefit will increase
if payment is deferred until a later time, and no evidence suggests the motive for not seeking
benefits in the present is anything other than an investment strategy. See Mahle v. Mahle, 341 So.
3d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
Q. Retirement
1. Courts may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon specific written
findings that following a diss olution of marriage the obligor has voluntarily retired and such
voluntary retirement was reasonable. See Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992); Anderson v.
Durham, 162 So.3d 65 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2014).
2. Pimm set forth the following criteria for modification in cases of voluntary
retirement. In determining whether an existing award of alimony should be reduced or terminated
because of the obligor’s voluntary retirement, the court should give consideration to, and make
written findings of fact regarding, the following factors:
a. The obligor’s age;
b. The obligor’s health;
c. The obligor’s motivation for retirement;
d. The nature and type of work performed by the obligor;
e. The customary age of retirement in the obligor’s profession;
f. The needs of the obligee;
g. The economic impact that a termination or reduction of alimony
would have on the obligee;
h. The assets of the obligee and the obligor accumulated or acquired
following the fin al judgment of dissolution;
i. The income of the obligee and the obligor earned following the final
judgment of dissolution; and
j. The social security benefits, retirement plan benefits, or pension
benefits payable to the ob ligor and the obligee following the final judgment of dissolut ion.
The burden is on obligor to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her retirement
is reasonable. See Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1992)
3. When determining whether the change in circumstances resulted in an
inability to pay support, the court could properly consider the former husband’s pension benefits
as part of his ability to pay alimony along with his employment income, even though the former
wife had waived any interest in said pension in the parties’ settlement agreement, when the former
husband petitioned for a downward modification of alimony due to his substantial decrease in
income. Kinne v. Kinne, 599 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997) (court may consider non-marital portion and post-dissolution accumulations of
22
pension as a source of income in order to determine the ability to pay alimony, but not the marital
portion which had been distributed to the payor spouse in the final judgment).
4. In Wiedman v. Wiedman, 610 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), the former
husband failed to meet his burden for modification where, although his early retirement at 61 was
involuntary due to poor health, he did not present evidence that he was unable to obtain alternate
employment suitable to his health conditions, and he admitted to being physically capable of
working.
5. This was clarified in Cleary v. C leary, 743 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA
1999). Where a deterioration in the payee’s p hysical condition forced early retirement and
evidence was presented that the payee could no longer perform his or her job or any other similar
job, an increase in alimony is proper. Cleary v. Cleary, 743 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
(following Pimm, supra, the court must consider the circumstances surrounding the voluntary
retirement such as a party’s age, health, motivation for retirement, and the customary age of
retirement others in that line of work, in order to determine whether voluntary retirement is
reasonable).
6. Post judgment retirement is a substantial change of circumstances that may
be considered along with other relevant ci rcumstances in an action to modify alimony. McManus
v. McManus, 638 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (standard of living to be used in determining
needs in a modification of alimon y proceeding is the standard established during the marriage, not
that existing at the time of the modification action) .
7. While a court may downwardly modif y alimony due to involuntary
retirement, the court may award nominal alimon y in these circumstances, which would allow the
court to re-address if the payor spouse became re-employed. Lopez v. Lopez, 970 So. 3d 388 (Fla.
2d DCA 2007)Error! Bookmark not defined.; Olsen v. Olsen, 964 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 5th DCA
2007).
8. Bauchman v. Bauchman, 253 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018): Former
husband filed for an alimony modification due to his “impending retirement.” Although still
employed at the time of the trial of this matter, he testified that he intended to retire upon
reaching
the age of 68 in August 2017 (the date of the trial is not mentioned, but the former husband filed
his petition in 2015 after turning 65). The trial court denied the modification on the basis that the
former husband’s income and net worth after he retires would be more than at the time of the MSA
which created the alimo ny obligation. The Fourth DCA reversed. If an MSA is silent as to
retirement, then such silence does NOT pre clude a modification at retirement. The court further
discussed the dif ference between “anticipated” and “contemplated and considered.” The trial
court’s belief that future retirement “was certainly no surprise” is not a sufficient ground to deny
a modification and even conflicts with Pimm.
9. Befanis v. Befanis, 293 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) – reversed tri al
court’s denial of modification of alimony upon husband’s retirement becaus e court’s finding that
the retirement was contemplated at time of previous modification was not supported by competent
substantial evidence.
23
10. Tanner v. Tanner, 330 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) – Reversing the
denial of the termination of alimony due to husband’s early retirement at age 64 for medical
reasons and rejecting the trial court's finding that language in the marital settlement agreement
referencing the presumptive retirement age and the need for possi ble modification upon Husband’s
retirement rendered his retirement an anticipated event.
11. Voluntary Retirement
a. Moniz v. Moniz, 979 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) – Competent
substantial evidence supported a downward modification of alimony based upon the former
husband’s voluntary early retirement as a police officer. The court recognized that the
former husband had endured major health complications, including two heart procedures,
a shattered knee, and an ankle injury throughout his career, and that coupled with his age
made retirement reasonable.
b. Holder v. L opez, 274 So. 3d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) – A reasonable
retirement at age 65 does not constitute underemployment.
c. Nangle v. Nangle, 286 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) – discussion
regarding “contemplated change in circumstances and changes as equity requires.”
12. Retirement Benefits
a. Kitchens v. Kitchens, 4 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009): T reating
discretionary IRA withdrawals as income for purposes of calculating alimony forces the
owner to deplete the account at a faster rate and deprives the owner of the full use of an
asset which, presumably, was subject to equitable distribution at the time of the divorce.
Mandatory or minimum IRA withdrawals resemble payments under a defined-benefit
pension plan because they are mandatory, and the amounts are calculated by applying a set
formula. Former husband’s discretionary withdrawals from Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) did not constitute income for purposes of calculating his alimony obligation;
however, mandatory, or minimum IRA withdrawals, which resemble payments under a
defined-benefit pension plan, are properly treated as income for purposes of calculating
alimony.
b. Rodolph v. Rodolph, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA June
17, 2022) –Reversable error to treat discretionary IRA withdrawals as income for purposes
of alimony award reversable error.
c. Gelber v. Brydger, 248 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018): Court
may consider the interest income available to a support recipient after reaching age 59 ½.
R. Supportive Relationships
1. Florida Statutes § 61.14 provides that a court may reduce or terminate
alimony upon establishment of a supportive relationship. § 61.14(1)(b), Florida Statutes, states:
24
The court may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon specific
written findings by the court that since the granting of a divorce and the
award of alimony a supportive relationship has existed bet ween the obligee
and a person with whom the obligee resides. On the issue of whether
alimony should be reduced or terminated under this paragraph, the burden
is on the obligor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
supportive relationship exists.
2. In determining whether an exist ing award of alimony should be reduced or
terminated because of an alleged supportive relationship between an obligee and a person who is
not related by consanguinity or affinity and with whom the obligee resides, the court shall elicit
the nature and extent of the relationship in question. The court shall give consideration, without
limitation, to circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following, in determining the
relationship of an obligee to another person:
a. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have held
themselves out as a married couple by engaging in conduct such as using the same last
name, using a common mailing address, referring to each other in terms such as “my
husband” or ”my wife,” or otherwise conducting themselves in a manner that evidences a
permanent supportive relationship.
b. The period of time that the obligee has resided with the other person
in a permanent place of abode.
c. The extent to which the obligee and the other pe rson have pooled
their assets or income or otherwise exhibited financial interdependence.
d. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has supported
the other, in whole or in part.
e. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed
valuable servi ces for the other.
f. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has performed
valuable servi ces for the other’s company or employer.
g. Whether the obligee and the other person have worked together to
create or enhance anything of v alue.
h. Whether the obligee and the other person have jointly contributed to
the purchase of any real or personal property.
i. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other person
have an express agreement regarding property sharing or support.
j. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other
person
have an implied agreement regarding property sharing or support.
25
k. Whether the obligee and the other person have provided support to
the children of on e another, regardless of any legal duty to do so.
3. This paragraph does not abrogate the requireme nt that every mar riage in
this state be solemnized under a li cense, does not recognize a common law marriage as valid, and
does not recognize a de facto marriage. This paragraph recognizes only that relationships do exist
that provide economic support equivalent to a marriage and that alimony terminable on remarriage
may be reduced or terminated upon the establishment of equivalent equitable circumstances as
described in this paragraph. The existen ce of a conjugal relationship, though it may be relevant to
the nature and extent of the relationship, is not necessary for the application of the provisions of
this paragraph.
4. Where the former wife was living with a boyfriend, the assistance in li ving
expenses to the former wife must be taken into consideration in determining whether an alimony
award to the recipient spouse shoul d be continued. See Martin v. Robbins, 194 So. 3d 563 (Fla.
5th DCA 2016); Murphy v. Murphy, 201 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
5. The fact that a boyfriend did yard work and maintenance work worth $132
and otherwise cont ributed $600 a month to the household expenses required a reduction in alimony
to $1 per year for so long as the wife’s needs were met. Pill v. Pill, 583 S o. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA
1992).
6. Robinson v. Robinson, 788 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001): where the
plain language of the parties’ marital settlement agreement provided for termination of alimony
upon the wife’s cohabitation with another male, the trial court improperly interfered with the
agreement by requiring consideration of a “financial impact” as a prerequisite to the modification
of alimony. Based upon the parties’ agreement, which was approved and incorporated into the
final judgment, the court should not have considered the financial impact of the cohabitation.
7. When a payee spouse is in a “supportive relationship” such that her fiancé
pays for al l of her expenses an d the former husband sought termination of alimony based on his
retirement at age 65 and the former wife’s “supportive relationship,” the Court should have
reduced the alimony award to a nominal award which would allow a
subsequent modification of
the parties’ circumstances had they changed in the future. Zeballos v. Zeballos, 951 So. 2d 972
(Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
8. Court must still evaluate the payee spouse’s “needs” for alimony even after
determining that she is in a “supportive relationship.” Review of the statutory criteria. § 61.08(2)
Florida Statutes, is sti ll applicable in determining the amount of alimony, even if there is a
supportive relationship. Bagley v. Bagley, 948 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Donoff v. Donoff,
940 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
9. The standard of review for modifications based on supportive relationships
is a mixed question of law and fact, The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed based on whether
there is substantial competent evidence to support the findings.
26
10. French v. French, 4 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009): Former husband filed
motion to reduce or terminate alimony payments to former wife. Once a trial court makes a finding
that a supportive relationship exists, it must by necessity either reduce or terminate alimony
because the obligee’s need has changed. Here, the former wife has been living with another man
with all the trappings of a marriage, without the formal legality of one, for longer than she was
married to the former husband. The former wife’s net worth had increased from $97,000 at the
time of the divorce to over $900,000. Significantly, the former wife’s living expenses had
decreased. She had no mortgage on her Florida home and no ongoing debts. And she lived half
the year free under Mr. Bradford’s roof. The very purpose of § 61.14(b), Florida Statutes (2006)
is to recognize the “economic support” that results when ostensibly independent individuals chose
to live under one roof in a “supportive relationship.” § 61.14(1)(b)(3), Florida Statutes. The statute
equates such a relations hip with “economic support equivalent to a marriage” and requires a
reduction or termination of alimony. § 61.14(1)(b)3, Fla. Stat. To find that such a relationship
exists but find no reduction in need is a non-sequitur. Based on the facts presented here and the
affirmative finding by the trial court that the former wife is in a supportive relationship, some
reduction, if not termination, in alimony is warranted.
11. The mere presence of a male tenant in the forme r wife’s residence does not
amount to cohabitation within the meaning of the parties’ marital settlement agreement or the
statute. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2015).
12. Former wife and her “boyfriend” were in a supportive relationship based
upon their holding themselves out as a marriage couple, living together for o ne and one-half years,
and even participating in a wedding ceremony. The former wife and her boyfriend also supported
each other, in whole or in part, as she paid him rent to live in his home and performed odd jobs
around the house. Martin v. Robbins, 194 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
13. Modifications for cohabit ation remain limited to being ret roactively applied
to the date of filing of a supplemental petition and cannot be modified
before such date to the date
when the recipient bega n to cohabit. Pollack v. Pollack, 181 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).
14. Bruce v. Bruce, 243 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)Error! Bookmark not
defi ned.: In a DIVORCE trial, the court properly considered the wife’s cohabitation in determining
whether there should be an alimony obligation. Fla. Stat. § 61.08(2)(j) permits the court to consider
“any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.” This catch-all allows the
court to consider a supportive relationship. But in doing so, the court must consider all of the
supportive relationship factors and must determine how, and to what extent, the supportive
relationship impacts the wife’s need for alimony.
15. Klokow v. Klokow, 323 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) Evidence supported
trial court’s finding that former wife was in supportive relationship with third party but reversed
for determination as to anal ysis of need for continued alimony and former husband’s ability to pay.
Trial court must address extent to which alimony paid to former wife was being used by her to
support third party or to offset third party’s ex penses.
27
S. Retroactive Modification
1. A modification should be retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition
seeking the modification as long as there is a finding that the payee had need and that the payor
had the ability to pay at the date of filing. Morgan v. Morgan, 590 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992);
Kirkland v. Kirkland, 618 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), disapproved of on other grounds,
Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1997); Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA
1999) (no error to make an increase in alimony retroactive to the date of filing where proof that
the wife had the need and that the husband had a continuous ability to pay from that date); see also
Helling v. Bartok, 987 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
2. A termination of alimony should be ef fective on the date of the filing when
the basis exists on the date of filing. Natoli v. Natoli, 641 S o. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Ray v.
Ray, 707 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
3. When a foreign order for alimony is established in Florida and sought to be
modified, the modification can be retroactive to the date of the filing and not just the date of the
domestication because under the full faith and credit clause of the constitution, the foreign
judgment must be treated the same as a non-foreign judgment, which is modifiable retroactively
to the date of filing. Barr v. Barr, 724 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Morin v. Morin, 466 So.
2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); see also Fabio v. Monell, 594 S o. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
(stating that no modification can occu r until the order is established, and therefore only retroactive
to that date).
4. The fact that a petition for modification of alimon y is pending does not give
the court any authority to award temporary alimony pending a final judgment in the action. Instead,
the modified alimony may be awarded retroactively to the date that the petition was filed. Saulnier
v. Saulnier, 425 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Robbie v. Robbie, 726 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999)
.
5. Error to make a retroactive modification to date of the supplemental petition
when payor received a lost wages settlement from his prior employer, which he then used betw een
filing and trial to both support himself and pay his support obligations. Gurdian v. Gurdian, 198
So. 3d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).
6. HOWEVER, Millan v. Millan, 241 S o. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018): “In
light of the former wife’s severely diminished financial capability – which is exacerbated by the
ordered reduction in h er ongoing alimony income – the circuit court ab used its discretion by giving
retroactive effect to the alimony modification so as to charge her with an obligation resulting from
past overpayment by the former husband.” Retroactive modification reversed.
7. Court was reversed whe n it reduced alimony but then awarded arrearage
payments which combine d to create a support obligation that improperly left the husband without
enough money to meet his expenses and support himself. Radziwon v. Radziwon, 710 So. 2d 748
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
28
T. Modification of Alimony Arrearages
1. Support obligations accruing under a court order in a domestic case become
vested rights of the payee and vested obligations of the pa yor which are n ot subject to retroactive
modification. Larger v. Diaz, 595 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); HRS v. Puglia, 600 So. 2d
484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Barr v. Barr, 724 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); O’Brien v. O’Brien,
Case No. 5D21-892, 2022 WL 4002177 (Fla. 5th DCA Sept. 2, 2022).
2. Past-due installments of alimony become vested propert y rights of the
recipient an d are not subject to retroactive modification. Dykes v. Dykes, 712 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1998).
3. “The right of a wife to payment of alimony in arrears is vested, and while it
is within the discretion of the court to refrain from holding the husband in contempt for non-
payment, the wife is entitled to enforcement of the payment by legal process and by such equitable
remedies as the trial cou rt may determine to be appropriate or necessary.” Doyle v. Doyle, 789 So.
2d 499 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing Smithwick v. Smithwick, 343 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
4. However, arrears and retroactive downward modifications may intersect.
Once a modification is granted and made retroactive, the obligor may seek reli ef from any money
judgments or arrearage awards that have already been granted based upon Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540 (b)(4) or (5). See also Benedict v. Benedict, 181 So. 3d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
II. MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
A. Jurisdiction
1. The court entering a child support order maintains continuing jurisdiction
to modify the amount, terms, and conditions of child support payments. § 61.13(1)(a) (2022).
a. Section 61.13(1)(a) provides, “in a proceeding under this chapter,
the court may at any time order either or both parents who owe a duty of support to a child
to pay support to the other parent, or, in the case of both parents, to a third party who has
custody in accordance with the child support guidelines schedule in s. 61.30.” §
61.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022).
b. The Court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents
to make child support payments has continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the initial
order to modify the amount and terms an d conditions of the child support payments if the
modification is found by the court to be in the bests interests of the child; when the child
reaches majority; if there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.§
61.13(1)(a)(2)(2022) Florida Statutes.
2. The jurisdiction is continuing but must be made through a supplemental
petition for modification. Woods v. Woods, 643 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Roshkind v.
Roshkind, 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
29
3. The circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider a father’s
request to extent that it sought prospective modification of child support established by
administrative order. Faulk v. Dept. of Revenue, 157 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
4. The court cannot enter an order temporarily modifying child support
pending the outcome of a supplemental petition for modification. Levinson v. Levinson, 895 S o.
2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). It was abuse of discretion to reduce husband’s child support
obligation prior to any financial disclosure. The trial court’s decision was based solely on
husband’s uncorroborated, self-serving testimony and without permitting wife appropriate
discovery. McCormi ck v. Boyd, 693 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
5. The Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act. Fla. Stat. §§
61.703-61.773 addr esses temporary modifications in the event a servicemember is deployed.
Deployment is defined as “the movement or mobilization of a servicemember for less than 18
months pursuant to uniformed service orders that: (a) are designated as unac companied; (b) do not
authorize dependent travel; or (c) otherwise do not permit the movement of family members to the
location to which the servicemember is deployed.”
6. Jurisdiction for Post-Majority Modification. Section 743.07(2) Florida
Statutes, authorizes support for dependent persons beyond the age of 18 years when such
dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to such person
reaching majority, or, if the person is dependent in fact, is between the ages of 18 and 19 and is
still in high school, and performing in good faith with the reasonable expectation of graduation
before th e age of 19.
a. Ruiz v. Ruiz, 783 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) holds that a trial
court retains jurisdiction post -majority to modif y the child support provisions of a marital
settlement agreement with respect to the child adjudicated dependent by reason of mental
and physical disabilities prior to reaching age of majority. See also Hastings v. Ha stings,
841 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), which holds that a 50-year-old autistic adult child
could seek support from his father 29 years after attaining the age of majority because he
was first diagnosed at age eight -- pr e-majority. But see Larwa v. Department of Revenue,
169 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), which states that generally a parents’ child support
obligation ceases when t he child turns eighteen and an extension of child support based
upon a child’s mental incapacity must be brought in the dissolution case before the child
reaches the a ge of major ity or subject matter jurisdiction is lost. An independent action
may be brought to adjudicate support of a depen dent who has reached the age of majority
by the dependent person. See also Loza v. Marin, 198 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
(holding that it is proper to allow fo r an extension of child support beyond the age of
majority, so long as the petiti on is filed before the termination of such existing support
obligation). See also Fernandez v. Fernandez, 314 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020) - Court
has continuing subject matter jurisdiction over adult dependent children and Phagan v.
McDuffee, 296 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) – Petition to modify child support filed 4
days before child turns 18, for child support into adulthood, for disabilities prior to age 18,
court has subject matter jurisdiction.
30
b. The father’s petition to terminate child support for an adult child
who married but had been declared dependent during her minority due to mental and
physical incapacity was denied. The court found th at the legislature could best answer this
question as to whether marriage is an emancipating act for a mentally and physically
incapacitated d ependent child. Harper v. Harper, 848 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
c. Former husband petitioned to modify and terminate his child
support based upon the child reaching the age of eighteen and graduating from high school.
Marital settlement agreement stated that husband would provide support through child’s
21
st
birthday if the child was “enrolled in college an d still living at home with the wife.” It
was error to require support past eighteen when child attended college and resided in
student housing and returned home only during breaks. Goff v. Kenny-Goff, 145 So. 3d
928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
d. Standing of Mother. The mother lacked standing to seek retroactive
child support for the first time over three years after the child’s 18th birthday with no
showing the child was otherwise legally dependent under section 743.07(2), Florida
Statutes (2015), or that such support was otherwise agreed to by the parties. Garcia-
Lawson v. Lawson, 211 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) distinguishing Friedman v.
Friedman, 508 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) and Grobleski v. Grobleski, 489 So. 2d
104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
e. Skelly v. S kelly, 300 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 20 20) – The mother
was proper party to enforce support judgment and child need not have been adjudicated
dependent prior to eighteenth birthda y for mother to have standing because daughter
became physicall y disabled and incapacitated prior to age 18 and act ion was brought prior
to age 18.
f. Standing of Child. The issue of whether or not the child had
standing was not an issue before the court in Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson , 211 So. 3d 137
(Fla. 4th DCA 2017). The court affirmed but remanded with instructions to strike the trial
court’s finding that, “That claim belongs to the child, who is no longer a minor.” The
appellate court relied upon Pitcher v. Waldo, 103 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2012)
(remanding to strike dicta from order where such language is a purely gratuitous
observation or remark made in pronouncing an opinion and which concerns some rule,
principle or application of law not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its
determination).
B. Notice/Due Process
1. Trial court has no jurisdiction to modify child support where there has been
no such relie f requested in the pleadings and no notice has been provided to the other party that
the issue would be heard. Torres v. Marzelli, 657 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Leibowitz v.
Leibowitz, 611 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Anthony v. Snell, 630 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993); State, Dept. FIRS v. Carter, 654 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
31
2. REPEAT – DUE PROCESS RE QUIRES YOU TO ASK FOR A
MODIFICATION IN THE WRITTEN PLEADING IN ORDER TO GET A
MODIFICATION. Golden v. Bass, 194 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
3. Voorhees v. Voorhees, 204 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Former wife
filed an amended emergency petition for modification of timesharing with the minor children and
sole parental responsibility and exclusive timesharing, and “any and all other r elief that the court
deems just and proper.” The former husband repeatedly objected that the former wife had not pl ed
for such relief during the trial, Trial court’s order modifying child support upward was reversed,
but without prejudice to the court considering the former wife’s request for a child support increase
after a proper pleading providing notice to the former husband of such request.
4. McGrath v. Caron, 8 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Mother filed motion
to find father in contempt for failure to pa y child support. The circuit court, sua sponte, found that
father did not have the present ability to pa y his support obligation, but did have the ability to pay
$300 per month in twice-monthly installments. The Court entered a non-final order reducing
father's child support obligation. Mother appealed, and the appellate Court held that a court cannot
modify a child support award unless the issue is presented with sufficient notice and an opportunity
for the nonmoving party to be heard. Notice of a contempt proceeding does not provide sufficient
notice that a court may modify a previously imposed child support obligation. Even if father had
requested a reduction in the amount of child support, the trial court failed to find that there was a
substantial change in circumstances, that the change was not cont emplated at the time of the final
judgment, and that the change is sufficient, material, involuntary, and perm anent in nature.
5. Where only basis pled for modification of child support was mother ’s
increased income, trial court could not modify based on father’s decreased income. Todano v.
Todano, 704 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
6. Former husband moved to reduce alimony and child support. Trial court
reduced alimony but increased child support. Reversed on increase
in child support since former
wife had not filed pleading requesting that relief. Dey v. Dey, 838 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA2003).
7. Father’s failure to plead the emancipation of one of the parties’ minor
children as a basis for modification of child support cannot raise emancipation as the basis for
modification at the hearing on modi fication. Father only raised the issue of ch ange in his income
in his petition to modify child support. Bonavito v. Bonavito, 958 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
8. The trial court granted change of custody and ordered former wife to pay
child support. Award of child support had to be reversed because former husband did not plead for
it. Spaeth v. Spaeth, 693 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). See also Moody v. Moody, 721 So. 2d
731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (violation of due process for court to modify child support during post-
dissolution hearing noticed only for contempt and custody matters).
9. It was error to temporarily suspend the for mer husband’s one-half
obligation toward travel expenses and to order all time-sharing less than four days in duration
occur in the vicinity of former husband’s residence as these iss ues were not pled and it is a violation
32
of due process to adjudicate issues not raised by pleadings. Cheek v. Hesik, 157 So. 3d 1099 (Fla.
1st DCA 2015).
C. Venue
1. The question of venue in modification actions is controlled by the
modification statute, § 61.14, Florida Statutes, which provides for the filing of a petition for
modification of child support in the Florida circuit court of the circuit wher e:
a. Both or either of the parties resided at the date of the execution of
any agreement;
b. Both or either of the parties resides at the date of the application for
modification;
c. The agreement was executed; or
d. The original order to be modified was rendered.
2. While venue to modify child support is proper in the place where eit her of
the parties resides at the time of filing the petition for modification or where the original order was
entered, where there is an enforcement action already pending in one of the permissible venues,
that is the prop er venue to bring an action to modify the same order. Ingrahm v. Ingrahm, 711 So.
2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
3. Where more than one venue is proper, the venue chosen by the Plaintiff, or
the Petitioner is presumptively the correct one. Washington v. Washington, 613 So. 2d 594 (Fla.
5th DCA 1993). See also Vero v. Vero, 659 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The burden is on
the party challenging venue to show substantial inconvenience of either witnesses or parties or
undue expense, in order to obtain transfer of venue. Id.
4. It was e rror to t ransfer the former wife’s modification action out of the
circuit of her residence and back to the county where the Final Judgment of Dissolution of
Marriage was entered simply because the original circuit had hea rd the contempt action and
reserved jurisdiction to award fees. Thompson v. Plowmaker, 679 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
5. Venue should be determined in county where the application was filed, not
by a separate suit filed elsewhere to enjoin another county from proceeding. Israel v. Israel, 874
So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
D. Modification of Foreign Decrees
1. Child support decrees entered by other states may be domesticated in
Florida pursuant to Florida Statutes § 55.501, et seq. Once the foreign support order has been
recorded and notice provided after a 30-day waiting period, a proceeding may be instituted to
modify the foreign order. If within 30 days of the notice, the judgment debtor contests the
enforcement of judgment, the court shall stay the enforcement automatically.
33
2. The “Uniform Interstate Family S upport Act,” and found at Fla. Stat. §
88.0011, et seq., outlines the procedure for the registration and domestication of foreign support
orders or IDO’s, and the subsequent modification of those orders. See § 88.6011 and § 88.6141,
Florida Statut es.
3. The UIFSA provides for continuing ex clusive jurisdiction over a child
support order to remain with the issuing state as long as the state remains the residence of the
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child fo r whom the benefit of the support order is issued, or
until all of the individual parties have filed written consents with the issuing tribunal to allow the
tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing exclusive jurisdiction. See §
88.2051 and § 88.6111, Florida Statutes. Once a child support order is modified by a tribunal
similar to it, the modifying tribunal assumes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
enforcement or modification of the modified order, and that order shall be recognized as the
controlling child support order. See § 88.6121; § 88.2051, Florida Statutes.
4. Where modification is sought in cases involving foreign child support
orders issued within the United States, the Florida court must first determine whether it has the
proper subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the federal Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act 28 U.S.C. § 1738B and UIFSA, Florida Statutes § 88.0011, et seq.,
in particular, Florida must meet the requirements of § 88.6111, Florida Statutes. S ee also
Lamancusa v. Dept. of Revenue, 250 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (UIFSA allows for the
modification of amount and duration of a fo reign chil d support decree).
5. Where there is no previous Florida action, it is necessary for new process to
issue and the court must acquire personal jurisdiction over the Respondent in order to enforce or
modify the judgment. See Florida Rule of Family Law Procedure 12.070(a).
6. Personal jurisdiction for the purpose of a child support modification action
cannot be acquired throu gh the jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJA where no relief under the
provisions of that act is sought. Overcash v. Overcash, 466 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
(holding that the wife’s complaint did not plead an action for enforcement under the UCCJA and
no other basis fo r long-arm jurisdiction seemed to exist, the husband’s motion to dismiss should
have been granted). See also Jess v. Dept. of Revenue, 711 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998);
Woodward v. Berkery, 714 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
7. Retroactive Modification of Foreign Child Support Decrees
a. There is divergence in the districts on the issue of whether a Florida
court has the authority to make a judgment modifying child support retroactive to the date
of filing of the petition to establish and modify a foreign decree.
b. The case of Morin v. Morin, 466 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985),
held that the Florida court could modi fy the foreign judgment retroactive to the date of the
filing of the petition for domestication and modification because § 55.503(1), Florida
Statutes, provides that once established as a Florida judgment, the foreign decree is to be
treated as though it was always a Florida decree.
34
c. The case of Fabio v. Monell, 594 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992),
held that a Florida court cannot modify a foreign judgment until it is domesticated and
established as a Florida judgment, an d therefore, could not make modification retroactive
to the date of filing in such cases. The conflict with Morin, supra, was certified to the
supreme court.
d. Barr v. Barr, 724 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), holding that
support can be ordered retroactive to the date of filing of a petition to domesticate and
modify, rather than the date of establishment of the foreign order, citing holding of Morin,
supra, and certifying conflict with Fabio, supra.
e. The rationale of allowing retroactive modification is that if, upon
domestication, the foreign decree is to be given the same effect as a Florida decree, and
Florida modification orders are permitted to be made retroactive to the date of filing the
petition, then to treat a domesticated decree as a judgment would only allow prospective
enforcement and would deny it the “same effect” as a Florida judgment as required by §
55.503(1), Florida Statutes. Note that these cases invol ve increases in child support, and
the general rule prohibiting downward modifications to be effective retroactively still
applies to the modification of domesticated decrees. Livingston v. Livingston, 686 S o. 2d
664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
E. Grounds for Modification
1. Either party may apply for modification of the court-ordered or agreed to
child support award whenever the financial circumstances of either party changes substantially, or
the child, who is a beneficiary of the agreement or court order, reaches majority. Secti on
61.13(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, provides three grounds for modification; however, § 743.07(2)
may provide a fourth in limited circumstances:
a. When the modification is found to be in the best interest of the child;
b. When the child reaches majority, is emancipated, marries, joins the
armed services, or dies;
c. When there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the
parties; or
d. If 743.07(2) applies, it provides that, “This section shall not prohibit
any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond
the age of eighteen years when such d ependency is because of a mental or physical
incapacity which began prior to such person reaching majority or if the person is dependent
in fact, is between the ages of 18 and 19, and is still in high school p erforming in good faith
with a reasonable expectation of graduating before the age of 19.
2. Section 61.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes, specifically provides a means to
satisfy the grounds of substantial change of circumstances noting that if the amount provided by
35
the guidelines under the present circumstances of the parties is diffe rent by at least 15% or $50.00,
whichever is greater, than the previously ordered obligation. See also Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 3d
1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Johansson v. Johansson, 270 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 4t h DCA 2019)
3. The court does not have the authority to modify the par ties’ agreement
providing for the payment of child support after majority once the child has rea ched majority.
Support then becomes contractual and not subject to modification. Zolonz v. Zolonz, 659 So. 2d
451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (cannot modify agreement for child support to be payable through college
once the child has reached majority); Richter v. Richter, 666 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
F. Statutory Factors for Modifying the Amount
Once a court finds that the moving party has met its burden of establishing a
substantial change in circumst ance, the trial court must consider all of the statutory factors in
recalculating the child support obligation. Child support guidelines analysis under section 61.30
applies to modification proceedings. Johansson v. Johansson, 270 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019);
Niemann v. Anderson, 834 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Court should set forth the reasons for
reduction upon rem and. Id.
G. Substantial Change in Circumstances
1. The party seeking change in the amount of child support has the burden of
proving a substantial change of circumstances which is significant, material, involuntary and
permanent in nature. Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Hale v.
Hale, 567 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Amoroso v. Phister, 689 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997); Jane v. Fero, 678 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Courts interpreting the meaning of the
term “substantial change of circumstances” have found that such a ch ange in circumstances must
be significant, material, involuntary, and p ermanent in nature to warrant a reduction in payments.
Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1997). Support can be modified only upon showing of
a change in circumstances since the last order. Amoroso v. Phister, 689 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA
1997).
2. A substantial change may be in either the child’s need s or either of the
parent’s income (increase or decrease). Vincent v. Vincent, 715 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
A substantial and material change is one that significantly impacts the ability to pay support.
Illustrating this concept is the conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to decrease child
support where the payor had a 48% decrease in income over a two-year period. Freeman v.
Freeman, 615 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
3. The substantial change must not have been anticipated. A downward
modification was reversed where the child support had been ordered pursuant to a settlement
agreement, an d the appellate court found that the obligor had not met the burden to modify the
agreement which had been made in the best interests of the children, and that the changes alleged
were not substantial and were anticipated at the time the agreement was made. The former wife
had remarried, the two older children had left home, and the younger child no longer required
preschool care. League v. Tassi ter , 536 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
36
4. Where child support was part of settlement agreement and obligor’s
expenses connected with upcoming military reassignment were or should have been contemplated,
downward modification was improper. Floyd v. Floyd, 393 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
5. Financial circumstances known to a party at the time of the original child
support agreement will not provide basis for modification. Also, self-induced tax problems will
not support modification. Conness v. Conness, 607 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
6. No need to prove a substantial change in circumstances where parties,
through counsel, agree to a modification at trial. Andrews v. Andrews, 712 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003).
7. Sunderwirth v. Sunderwirth, 332 So. 3d 1087 (Fl a. 2d DCA 2022) - Error
to includes Moth er’s fiancée’s in-kind contributions when calculating child support.
8. Increased Need Alone
a. Error to grant modification of child support where ther e was an
increased need, but an increased ability to pay was not proven. Henderson v. Henderson,
619 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
b. It has been held that child support can be increased even if the only
change is a substantial change in the income of the obligor. Alfrey v. Alfrey, 553 So. 2d 393
(Fla. 4th DCA 1989); § 61.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes (the guidelines themselves provide
“the basis for proving a substantial change in circumstances…[if] the amount provided for
under the guidelines shall be at least 15 percent or $50, whichever is greater…” Whight
v. Whight, 635 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994) (child support guidelines apply to modification proceedings).
c. The mere fact that a parent experiences an increase in income or
assets does not mean child support will automatically be increased.
1) The true criteria are whether there has been a substantial
increase in the obligor’s actual ability to pay. Kersh v. Kersh, 613 S o. 2d 585 (Fla.
4th DCA 1993) (despite the fact that payor had a substantial increase in income,
the court determined it was not proper to increase child support given the fact that
payor had added expenses of subsequent wife and children so that his actual ability
to pay had not increased, and also because there was no proof that the children’s
needs were not being met by the existing award).
2) The court, in its discretion, may also find that in spite of an
increased ability to pay, there has been no change in the needs of the children after
considering the lifestyle of the parties during the marriage. Taylor v. Taylor, 734
So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (affirming that the court’s denial of and upward
child support modification notwithstanding 50% increase in income and wealth of
payor, where there was insufficient proof of the change in the needs of the children
37
to warrant modification considering evidence that the parties had not lived lavishly
during the marriage and the family philosophy was to maintain trusts for the
children rath er than to spend extravagantly).
3) While children are generally entitled to share in a parent’s
good fortune, this must be consistent with the court’s determination of the
appropriate lifestyle intended by the p arents. Miller v. Schou, 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla.
1993); Finley v. Scott, 707 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1998); Hosseni v. Hosseni, 564 So. 2d
548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
9. A deviation downward of the presumptive child support guideline award is
appropriate when all of the children’s needs w ere being met. A child is entitled to share in good
fortune of the parent consistent with an appropriate li festyle, as determined by the trial court. In
this case, “appropriate lifestyle” was being met by the current child support award, an d no
modification appropriate. Ferraro v. Ferraro, 891 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
10. Father moved to modify his child support obligation after entry of final
judgment adopting the parties’ marital settlemen t agreement based on the mother obtaining full-
time employment. Trial court denied the modification finding that the mother’s employment was
contemplated at the time of the agreement and did not constitute an unanticipated change in
circumstances. The appellate court reversed, finding that an increase in ability to pay is itself
sufficient to warrant an increase in child support. Paulette v. Rosella, 267 So. 3d 571 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2019).
11. Age or Emancipation as a Basis fo r Modification
a. When a settlement agreement/final judgment, does not contain
automatic reduction of step-down of child support due to the em ancipation of one child,
then the payor must file a petition to modify his child support obligation. Alvarado v. Dept.
of Revenue ex rel. Alvarado, 194 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).
b. “Ordinarily, a child support order terminates autom atically on a
child’s eighteenth birthday. This is because a parent has no legal duty to continue to
provide support to a chil d who has reach ed the age of majority unless the trial court has
made a finding of dependence pursuant to section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (2010), or
the parties otherwise agree.” This termination includes the obligation to pay medical
expenses for the child. Dixon v. Dixon, 233 So. 3. 3d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
c. Section 61.14(9) provides that “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the
court or agreed to by the parties, the obligation to pay the current child s upport for that
child is terminated when the child reaches 18 years of age or the disability of nonage is
removed.” The termination of child su pport does not terminate the vested rights to the
payment of an arrearage or retroactively determ ined support. Id.
d. Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993): the wording
of an order for child support should track the statute and require the payment of child
support “until such time as the child reaches age eighteen, marries, becomes self-
38
supporting, or dies, whichever comes first,” with the understanding th at the obligor may
file a petition to modify, should it subsequently ap pear that one of the statutory exceptions
of Section 743.07(2), is applicable. See also Nerney v. Nerney, 752 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2000).
e. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 744 S o. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999): child
support order requiring father to pay support until child reached 19 or graduated high
school, whichever came first, had to be modified to reflect termination of the child support
obligation when child reaches majority, marries, becomes self-supporting, or dies,
whichever event comes first. In the event the circumstances change so that it appears that
a child will graduate high school after the child’s 18th birthday, but before thei r 19th
birthday, a petition for modification can be filed.
f. Rose v. Rose, 8 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009): Nothing in §
743.07(2) prevents the termination of child support after the child turns 18, even if he or
she is still in high school, absent the parties’ agreement.
12. Timesharing as Basis for Modification
a. § 61.30(11)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that “[a] parent’s failure
to regularly exercise the court-ordered or agreed time-sharing sch edule not caused by the
other parent which resulted in the adjustment of the amount of child support pursuant to
subparagraph (a)10 or paragraph (b) shall be deemed a substantial change of circumstances
for purposes of modifying the child support award. A modification pursuant to this
paragraph shall be retroacti ve to the date the noncustodial parent first failed to regularly
exercise the court -ordered or agreed time- sharing schedule.” (Emphasis added)
b. However, if the timesharing schedule is not modified, then it is error
to prospectively modify the child support payment. A parent’s failure to exercise
timesharing oc curs “over a period of time” and pursuant to section 61.30(11)(c), “during
that time frame” the other parent is entitled to modification of the child support award.
Andrews v. Andrews, 219 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) citing Buhler v. Buhler, 83 So.
3d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). M yers v. Lane, 283 So. 3d 337 ( Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
c. Where relocation of a non-custodial parent resulted in less
timesharing, the custodial parent is entitled to an increase in child support for two autistic
children. Kuttas v. Ritter, 879 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
d. Where an agreement afforded the former husband with over 40%
overnights, but former husband did not actually spend 40% or more ov ernights, former
husband’s request for retroactive modification was denied. Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d
387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
e. An agreed-upon change in timesharing may not be the grounds for
a downward modification of child support. Rubman v. Honig, 817 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2002).
39
f. Support could not be ret roactively modified to the date the father
was granted temporary custody when he failed to ask for a modi fication of child support in
his motion for temporary custody. Ivonovich v. Va lladarez, 190 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA
2016).
H. Involuntary Change v. Voluntary Change
1. No error in downward modification of child support as payor lost job and
was unable to obtain equivalent employment. The loss of income was involuntary, and imputation
of income was, therefore, not appropriate. However, the court held that once payor satisfied
arrearage obligation that had accumulated during unemployment, resulting in improved ability to
pay, a future increase in child support would be justified without the need to show a substantial
change. Grady v. Grady, 640 S o. 2d 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
2. Error not to reduce child support obligation further where payor had
suffered a substantial, involuntary, and permanent decrease in income due to a slump in the real
estate market. Levin v. Levin, 613 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). A reduction in child support
which was set by agr eement and was above the guidelines, was proper where obligor had met the
burden of showing his reduced ability to pay due to a reduced cash flow. Knight v. Knight, 702 S o.
2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
3. Error to deny a r equest for downward modification where the record clearly
reflects reduced income and a substantial change in appellant’s financial circumstances.
Husband’s income went from $146K to $89K when he was forced to ch ange employment. Whitney
v. Whitney, 624 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
4. Error to find former husband voluntarily reduced his income where he
bought medical practice that he later found had financial irregularities which led to its closure and
the subsequent reduction in income due to economic downturns was sufficient to warrant a
reduction in the child support obligation. Laliberte v. Laliberte, 698 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA
1997).
5. Voluntary reduction is, for instance, the r eduction for payor in furthe rance
of payor’s education. When a temporary redu ction or termination of the child support obligation
is sought by the obligor as a result of his/her plan to go back to school, the court’s decision must
be based on an analysis of what would be in the best interest of the child(ren), rather than whether
the decision to reduce in come is voluntary or involuntary. Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811
(Fla. 1997) (denying the obligor’s request for a temporary reduction in support so that he could
attend law school where it was determined
that the children would not ultimately benefit from the
reduction as one child would have reached majority by the time the father graduated, and the other
child would only be a minor for a few years after the graduation); Dept. of Revenue v. Thomas,
659 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holdin g that voluntarily an d unilaterally taking oneself out
of the full-time work force to pursue education is insufficient justification for a downward
modification of child support); and Wollschlager v. Veal, 601 S o. 2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
(unilateral decision to pursue higher education cannot excuse a parent from his/her child support
obligations).
40
6. Ledbetter v. Bell, 698 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997): Following the
ruling of the Florida Supreme Court in Overbey, the district court affirmed the decision of the trial
court that it would not be in the best interests of the children for the father/obligor, a medical
doctor, to pursue a lengthy post-graduate fellowship program, as the children were older and would
never benefit from educational pursuits of their father, and ther efore the tria l court concluded that
it was appropriate to impute income to the father/obligor.
7. Pribble v. Pribble, 800 So. 2d 743 (Fla 5th DCA 2001), discussed Overbey
v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1997), stating that Overbey indicated that a court may enter an
order modifying child support when the modification is found to be necessary, in the best interest
of the child, or when there is a substantial change of circumstances.
8. The fact that the mother had moved to a new residence which was
substantially more expensive to maintain, could not form the basis for an increase since the change
was voluntary. Vandenbosch v. Elkins, 419 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
9. Denial of modification of child support was proper where payor’s reduction
in income w as voluntary, and payor had enga ged in only a limited job search. Robinson v.
Robinson, 597 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
10. No rule that requires a support obligor to remain e mployed in a position that
earns the highest income possible where change in careers is made in good faith. Daniel v. Moats,
718 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
11. Income may be imputed where it is demonstrated that a spouse is voluntarily
unemployed or underemplo yed, § 61.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes; Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So.
2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Voluntary unemployment or underemployment is not a basis for
reducing a parent’s child support obligation. Under the statutory sche me, once the trial court
imputes income to the unemployed or underemployed parent, the court then determines th e
obligation of each parent as to the guideline amount. Work v. Provine, 632 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994) (no error in imputing income and refusing to modify child support where the payor
left an
old job on mere expectation that he might lose it); Bator v. Osborne, 983 So. 2d 1198 (Fla.
2d DCA 2008) (there was ample evidence to find former husband was voluntarily underemployed
based on former wife’s testimony of former husban d’s earnings, and former husband’s only reason
for li mited work w as the stress and time of litigation).
12. Mascola v. L usskin , 727 So. 2d 328 ( Fla. 4th DCA 1999): Incarceration of
father for soliciting murder of pregnant mother in order to eliminate child support obligation
did not entitle father to reduction or elimination of the obligation during imprisonment; his conduct
leading to inability to pay was voluntary. Criminal conduct cannot excuse obligation to pay child
support; unlike obligor who is unemployed or faced with reduction in pay through no fault of his
own, incarcerated person had control over his actions and should be held to consequences.
Ultimately, the Court held that “commission of a crime is a voluntary act,” and denies modification
on this ground. The Court also considered the particular crime committed in this case, soliciting
murder of his girlfriend after she became pregnant to avoid paying child support, to trigger the
“clean hands doctrine.” But, Florida Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in Dept. of Revenue
41
v. Jackson, 846 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003), and while it supported the Mascola ruling, it did so only
“to the extent that it provides that an incarcerated parent may not automatically have his or her
child support” modified based solely on a reduction in income from incarceration.” The Supreme
Court approved a procedure to allow the modifying parent to file a petition to modify and requiring
the trial court to place the petition in abeyance until the paying parent’s release. Note, this standard
may be completely different in the context of setting an initial child support award. See Dept. of
Revenue v. Llamas, 196 S o. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
13. Wood v. Wood, 162 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) indicates that it is error
to im pute income to the former wife and reduce the former husband’s child support obligation to
zero on basis that the former wife’s unemployment is voluntary without findings regarding her
diligence in seeking alternative employment. See also T hompson v. Makicki, 169 So. 3d 271 (Fla.
2d DCA 2015), which held that reliance on past work history alone is insufficient to support
imputation of income to a former wife regarding her voluntary unemployment without sufficient
findings regarding recent work history, occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings level
in the community.
14. Gillespie v. Holdsworth, 333 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) - Wife
relocated to Missouri without a job lined up and took employment making much less than she
previously had in Florida. During the modification action. The trial court errored in imputi ng
income to Wife at the income level she had previously earned in Florida. As Wife had moved to
Missouri, the court should have imputed income based on her earning potential in Missouri.
I. Permanent Change
1. Permanency is met where the change is not temporary or transient and
encompasses an extended period of time, i.e., at least one year. Freeman v. Freeman, 615 So. 2d
225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). See also Bennett v. Dept. of Revenue, 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995)(finding that although proper to deny reduction in child support where unemployment was
temporary, obligor was entitled to suspension of child support obligation during time of
unemployment).
2. When a father filed only three weeks after losing a job to decrease child
support, it was not enough time to determine permanence. Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
3. A financial set-back occasioned by a strike is only temporary and would not
justify a decrease in support. Burdack, supra.
4. The obligor sought a reduction in the agreed-to amount of child support
after being terminated from employm ent at a law firm, and although he had established his own
law practice, it had not yet become profitable. The court found the obli gor’s earnings had been
significantly reduced and granted the downward modification; however, the court noted that the
obligor’s decrease in income may not be permanent. Newnum v. Newnum, 715 So. 2d 306 (Fla.
5th DCA 1998).
42
5. Error to permanently reduce child support where loss of employment is only
temporary. Court should have temporarily reduced support until former husband could re- establish
himself. Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Dept. of Revenue v. Heirholzer, 708
So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
6. Error to fail to decrease child support whe re former husband was
unemployed when he sought modification, and at the time of the hearing over two years later, he
was earning approximatel y 35% less than when he entered into the settlement agreement, and
where former wife’s earnings had more than doubled since the entry of the final judgment. Court
found no merit in former wife’s argument that although former husband’s earnings had decreased,
his expenses had decreased as well. The court explained that the former husband naturally had to
decrease his expenses to live, and he should not be penalized for attempting to live within his
means. Additionally, the court noted that any financial assistance received by the former husband
from his girlfriend could not be assessed against him where there was no evidence that she would
continue to provide such help in the future. Bunassar v. Diaz, 804 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
7. The trial court granted the father’s petition for downward modification
based upon change in circumstances: The father’s commissions were temporarily reduced due to
market conditions. The appellate court revers as the change was not permanent. The appellate court
found that the father did not experience a full year of substantially lowered income, the trial court
failed to use the date the parties executed their marital settlement agreement in determining the
length of the changed circumstances, and the father’s testimony reveal ed that his income started
decreasing in 2015 and continued throughout 2016, and that he “knew about his decreasing income
before the Final Judgment on August 26, 2016. Tisdale v. Tisdale, 264 So. 3d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019).
J. Burden of Proof in Prior Agreement Cases
1. Section 61.14(7), Florida Statutes (2018), provides that, “When
modification of an existing order of support is sought, the proof required to modify a settlement
agreement and the proof required to modify an award established by court order shall be the same.”
Although § 61.14(7), Florida Statutes, makes thi s burden of modi fying child support fixed by
agreement eq ual to the burden for modi fying support established by court order, the Florida
Supreme Court has held fast to the long-followed rule that there is a heavier burden to reduce child
support that was established by agreement and incorporated into an order than there otherwise
would be if the child support was established by the court. Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811
(Fla. 1997); Knight v. Knight, 702 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that based on the
Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Ov erbey, it appears that the Supreme Court has decided that
section 61.14(7) does not apply to a petition to reduce child support); Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So.
2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). But see Knowlton v. Knowlton, 282 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).
Former husband makes a compelling argument for the 1
st
to follow the 2
nd
,4
th
, and 5
th
in
acknowledging the statute as amended in 1993, establishes the same burden for modifications of
orders and agreements; does not rule on it because not raised in lower court.
2. The party moving for a r eduction of child support bears a heavy burden to
demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the final judgment, and
43
a heavier burden may apply when the child support award has been made pursuant to a settlement
agreement. Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Dept. of Revenue v.
Dodge, 647 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 703 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997); Newman v. Weber, 715 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
3. Amendments to child support statute requiring reduction of child support
when child spends at least 40% of the time with the noncustodial parent could not be used as sole
basis upon which forme r husband could seek modification of child support, where final judgment
of dissolution, with settlement agreement, became final prior to effective date of amendments;
payor must demonstrate an independent substantial change in circumstance. Fleischmann v.
Fleischmann, 868 S o. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
4. In order for the change in circumstances alleged to be “substantial” in order
to meet the heavy burd en to reduce child support, it must be significant, material, involuntary and
permanent. Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992); Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811 (Fla .
1997); N ewman v. Weber, 715 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Perez v. Perez, 973 So. 2d 1227
(Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (abuse of discretion to deny modification of child support where husband’s
severe loss of income had persisted for nearly a year at the time of the final hearing).
5. A mother’s improved financial circumstances requires that she contribute
more to the support for her child but affords no basis for reducing the husband’s agreed-upon child
support. Ibanez v. Salazar, 459 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). See also Knapp v. Knapp, 778 So.
2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (trial court should have granted f ather’s petition seeking a modification
of child support based on mother’s $30,000 increase in her income); Miller v. Schou, 616 S o. 2d
436 (Fla. 1993) (an increase in the ability to pay may be sufficient to increase child support
payments). See Gore v. Smith, 306 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020), int eresting case regarding
proof of income for modification; and Paulette v. Rosella, 267 So. 3d 571
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019),
mother’s employment was substantial change in circumstances even if contemplated.
6. Former husband requested a decrease in child support based on a change in
circumstance resulting from his relocation to Sarasota County where former wife and children
relocated. The trial court reduced support, but appellate court reversed. The former wife was
permitted to relocate under the parties’ marital settlement agreement, so the ch ange in former
husband’s residence to move closer to former wife and children was not unanticipated, an d
therefore, child support should not have b een reduced. Dept. of Reven ue v. Kaiser, 890 So. 2d 364
(Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
7. Former husband changed jobs (opinion doesn’t say whether it was a
voluntary change or not) and experienced a redu ce d income as a result. Former husband petitioned
to eliminate his alimony and reduce his child support. The trial court granted the request to reduce
child support but denied the request to eliminate alimony. Former husband appealed claiming the
trial court should have eliminated alimony and reduced child support even more. The former wife
appealed claiming child support shoul d not have been reduced at all. The appellate court
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in altering the agr eed child support obligation.
Robinson v. Robinson, 219 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) citing Bish v. Bish, 404 So. 2d 840
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (explaining that a “fundamental pre-requisite to modification based upon
44
substantial change in circumstances is a showing that the change is sufficient, material, involuntary
and permanent in nature” and noting that “heavier burden rested upon the movant seeking a
reduction when parties agreed upon initial arrangement); see also Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d
811 (Fla. 1997). Trial court also erred by requiring payments to be made through State
Disbursement Unit, relief that neither party requested and was contrar y to consent final judgment.
8. The mere fact that the guidelines provide an amount of child support
substantially less than the amount of support provided for in the parties’ agreement is, by itself,
insufficient grounds for modification of child support. See Turner v. Turne r, 695 So. 2d 422 (Fla.
3d DCA 1997).
K. Timeframe for Court’s Consideration
Trial court was not bound by the filing date of the modification petiti on but could
consider changes in former husband’s financial condition through the date of the final hearing on
modification where former husband had filed for a downward modification of child support
alleging ongoin g deterioration of businesses. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 712 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998).
L. Retroa ctive Modification
1. Due to the concept of res judicata, child support may not be modified prior
to the date that a petition for modification is filed. See Krause v. Krause, 793 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001) (the child support provision in the final judgment did not allocate the amount of
support attributable to each child; the general master erred in retroactively terminatin g child
support for both children before the date the father filed his petition for modification of child
support); Dept. of Revenue v. Wilson, 782 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (when the child support
provision fails to allo cate the amount of support attributable to each child, the trial court cannot
retroactively terminate chil d support before the date the petitioner requested such relief).
2. The trial court can only modify child support payments prospectively from
the time that a petition for modification is filed. McDowell v. McDowell, 770 S o. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1 st
DCA 2000). See Stokes v. Huelsman, 770 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Fayson v. Fayson, 482
So. 2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Wertheim v. Wertheim, 667 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
3. Generally, an increase in a child support aw ard should be made retroactively
to the date of filing. Batts v. Batts, 600 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (involving domesticated
judgment); Whight v. Whight, 635 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (whether to make increased
support order retroactive to the date of filing is discretionary); Kerle v. Kerle, 700 So. 2d 127 (Fla.
1st DCA 1997); Bardol v. Martin, 763 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
4. Error not to make an increase in child support retroactive to a date prior to
the date of filing where need and ability to pay existed at the time of filing. Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So.
2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Poyner v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Young v.
Young, 745 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Sno wden v. Snowden, 985 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA
2008).
45
5. Generally, an increased need must be alleged in a petition for modification
of an order increasing support made retroactively to the date of filing. Butler v. Brewster, 629 So.
2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). However, specific allegations of increased need at the time of filing
were not required as a prerequisite for having increased support made retroactive to the date of
filing where a modification was not founded upon an increase in need. Banyas v. Banyas, 704 So.
2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
6. The court has no authority to grant modification retroactive to a date prior
to the filing of the modification action. Wood v. Wood, 590 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992);
Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Chapman v. Chapman, 638 So. 2d
1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Wertheim v. Wertheim, 667 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Garrett
v. Garrett, 707 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); McDowell v. McDowell, 770 So. 2d 1289 (Fla.
1st DCA 2000).
7. Contrast with § 61.30(17), Florida Statutes, which provides in an initial
determination of child support the court has discretion to award child support retroactive to the
date when the parents did not reside together in the same household with the child, not to exceed
a period of 24 months preceding the filing of the petition, regardless of whether that date precedes
the filing of the petition.
8. When the child resided with the obligor for 21 months with the consent of
the obligee, and the obligor had not paid support during that time, a special circumstance was
found to exist entitling the obligor to a credit in suit seeking arrearage which had accrued during
that 21 months, even though a modification of child support order was not sought by the obligor
in advance of time the payments were due. Dept. of Revenue v. Watt, 681 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996). See also Alexander v. Alexander, 683 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996 ) (absent extraordinary
circumstances, child support cannot be modified retroactively to a date preceding the date of the
petition for modification).
9. Error to make a reduction of child support retroactively to a date prior to the
date of filing, absent extraordinary or compelling reasons. Livingston v. Livingston, 686 So. 2d
664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Dept. of Revenue v. Fisher, 738 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999);
Martland v. Arabia, 987 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
10. Error to make wife pay child support and terminate husband’s obligation
retroactive to date prior to his motion. Alexander v. Alexander, 683 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA
1996). See also Castlebe rry v. Morgan, 974 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2 008) (error to make a
reduced obligation retroactive to the date of filing where evidence did not show a decrease in
income at that time).
11. Trial court should not have ordered child support retroactive to a date before
the petition for modification was filed. Ronk v. Willis, 220 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) citing
Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“ It is error to award child support
retroactive to a date prior to a request for modifi cation of an order which previously addressed
child support.”); Wertheim v. Wertheim, 667 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
46
12. Trial court erred in retroactively modifying support to a date before the
petition seeking the relief was filed. Birkmire v. Birkmire, 219 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
(citing Galperin v. Galperin, 862 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
13. Don’t include child care costs in retroactive support that didn’t exist.
Retroactive child support calculation may not include costs that were no t incurred during the
retroactive time frame. Parties had a child and order establishing paternity and setting monthly
child support payment was entered. Parties had a second child, and an order of paternity was
entered. This order also modified child support for both children. At the hearing on October 28,
2015, the mother testified she had been paying childcare expenses for three months, or since the
end of July 2015. The trial court calculated retroactive child support, including the childcare costs
of $170.00 per week for the time frame between January 13, 2014 to July 2015. The retroactive
child support could in clude childcare costs for the retroactive time frame in which they were
incurred (sin ce the end of July 2015). H.R.N. v. S.D.L., 227 So. 3d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).
14. Hollonbeck v. Hollonbeck, 279 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019): Trial court
must award pre-judgment interest for its award of retroactive child support.
M. Calculation of Support
1. Segnini v. Segnini, 10 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009): Child support
obligation is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to statutory requirements. Child
support should be based on income less the expenses need to create income. Section 61.30(2)(a)(3),
Florida Statutes, provides that “business income” means gross receipts minus ordinary and
necessary expenses required to produce income. The trial court misapplied the statute by failing to
deduct father’s monthly lease payments and other ordinary and necessary business expenses such
as insurance and fuel from his gross business receipts in calculating father's gross monthly income.
The father’s business expenses were required to be deducted for calculating gross monthly income.
2. Shaw v. Nelson,4So.3d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009): The trial court must
determine child support based on th e evidence presented on the record. Where the former husband
failed to present evidenc e that would lead to an accurate calculation of his income, the trial court
properly relied on the evidence presented by the former wife, who had the burden to show a
substantial change of circumstances since the final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
3. It is error to deviate more than 5% from the guidelines without explanation.
H.R.S. v. Christman, 635 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Dept. of Revenue v. Beal, 672 So. 2d 608
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
4. It is error to award child support in downward modification based upon
what the court deems is equitable and a subjective figure rather than calculating it based upon the
statutory guidelines. Ervin v. Fla. Dept. of Reven ue, 152 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
5. Adkins v. Sotolongo, 197 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016): When
modifying the amount, the trial court must set forth the specific statutory findings per § 61.30 that
serve as the basis for any departure from the guidelines. Additionally, child support payment may
not be subordinated to attorney’s fee or G.A.L fees. See also Russ ell v. Russell, 240 So. 3d 890
47
(Fla 1st DCA 2018) (reversing a child support modification because the trial court made no
findings regarding the incomes of the parties); Ness v. Martinez, 249 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018) (reversing because the trial court failed to explain why certain deductions to income were
not included in the child support guideline).
6. If the court finds ground to modify child support, then all child related
expenses may also be modified at the same time, so long as such relief is properly requested.
Medical support pa yments are subject to modification in a child support modification proceeding.
Dixon v. Dixon, 233 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).
7. Seith v. Sei th, 337 So. 3d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) - Child Support
modification reversed where number of overnights miscalculated, court f ailed to include an income
deduction order, and trial court’s order included incorrect child support guideline r atios for
collateral child expenses.
8. Health Insurance
a. According to § 61.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the trial court must
consider the availability of health insurance for children, and every child support order
must contain a provision for health insurance when it is reasonably available. This is in
case the parties’ agreement as to child support fails to contain a provision related to health
insurance. Butler v. Butler, 622 S o. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Lewis v. L ewis, 667 So. 2d
390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
b. Secti on 61.30(8), Florida Statutes, provides that any health
insurance costs ordered shall be added to the basic obligation, an d money prepaid by the
non-custodial parent for health insurance shall be deducted from the child support
obligation. See Savery v. Savery, 670 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
c. Trial court erred in not setting limits on the obligor’s duty to pay
health insurance and non-covered medical expenses as a part of the child support award.
Edgar v. Edgar, 668 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
d. The trial court deducted the dependent, as well as individual
coverage costs of health insurance, from the former husband’s income before calculating
child support. The court should reduce the former husband’s income only by the cost of his
coverage, not the dependent coverage, before c alculating child support. Miller-Bent v.
Miller-Bent, 680 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Dale v. Dale, 714 So. 2d 614
(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ( error to deduct cost of childr en’s health insurance from income when
determining child support).
e. The trial court cannot order the former husband to provide health
insurance for children following a divorce, absent a finding that such insurance is
reasonably available. Calderon v. Calderon, 730 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
f. Former wife’s amended emergency petition that requested “access
to the minor children’s health insurance in order to make any necessary chang es or gain
48
information as need ed for the benefit of the minor children” was sufficient to plead for a
modification to health insurance. Voorhees v. Voorhees, 204 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016).
9. Social Security Benefits. Minor child’s Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) benefits due to child’s medical condition could not be credited against father’s child support
obligation, either alone or combined with dependent benefits child received from father’s Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI); SSI income to child in her own right was intended to provide
additional support due to h er special needs and was not a basis to reduce father’s obligation,
although dependent benefits received by child under SSDI could be credited toward father’s
obligation. Ford v. Ford, 816 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
N. Waiver of Right to Modification
1. Inability to waive right to modification of child support:
a. Parents are obligated by law to contribute to the support of their
children and this obligation cannot be disposed of via contract. The court therefore has the
authority to modify child support provisions despite the parties’ agreement that neither will
petition for child support. See Guadine v. Guadine, 474 So. 2d 1245 (Fla.4th DCA 1985).
b. An agreement requiring a spouse to pay six percent of their gross
income for child support, no matter how high or low the income becomes, no matter what
the spouse’s expenses may be, and no matter what the child’s need is, is subject to close
scrutiny and more vulnerable to modification than a customary agreement which is
designed to provide for an amount at least comparable to a child’s needs. Lew is v. Lewis,
450 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
c. No error in granting modification of final judgment in order to award
child support, as the ch ange of circumstances was apparent when the parties’ existing
stipulation, which had no provisions for child support in any amount, was compared to the
guidelines provisions, at a time of father’s request for support. McClain v. Karll, 686 So.
2d 794 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
d. Where mother had entered agreement with father to forego yearly
adjustment of alimony and child support which had been provided for by settlement
agreement incorporated into final judgment in exchange for father paying annual private
school tuition, court found mot her had waived her right to seek modification of child
support, and mother ’s argument that parties could not agree to waive child support did not
apply since there was no violation of public policy as children’s best interests were met by
agreement, and parties had not waived father’s entire obligation to support children. Lester
v. Lester, 736 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
2. Essex v. Ayres, 503 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). A party’s request to
modify the amount of child support fixed by agreement which had not been previously reviewed
by the court nor incorporated into the final judgment, does not require a showing of substantial
49
change of circumstances. Rather, in an action to increase of agreed-upon child support, it must be
demonstrated that the amount agre ed to by the parties was not in the best interest of the child, and
that payor has the ability to pay more.
3. Provision of settlement agreement that obligated parents to divide costs of
children’s college education was not modifiable where settlement agreement labeled and treated
college cost provision differently from provision for child support which w as in conformity with
the guidelines. Layman v. Layman, 738 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
4. Parents can enter into an agreement to modify court-ordered child support,
and it will be enforced only if the children receive substantially the same amount of support, and
the new arran gement is determined to serve the best interests of the children. Ervin v. Chason, 750
So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DC A 2000).
5. Parents can agree to fixed child support obligation and right to modification
is, therefore, waived. Myer v. Kaye, 990 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
O. Reduction or Abatement of Child Support Obligation
1. Error to refuse to temporarily suspend child support payments where payor
was involuntarily terminated from job and thereafter engaged in ex haustive job search, depleted
his assets, and his unemployment benefits expired. Ronan v. Ronan, 621 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993). See also Manning v. Manning, 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
2. Where the payor’s loss of job is definite, no arrearage should accumulate
during the period of temporary reduction if he pays the reduced child support. Aarts v. Aarts, 636
So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). See also Dept. of Revenue v. Heirholzer, 708 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998) (order reducing child support obligation due to job loss was temporary as there was
no suggestion at the time of the order that the unemployment would be permanent).
3. In the right circumstances, the court may fashion some form of temporary
relief. See Manning v. Manning, 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (concluding that where a
reduction in income was not shown to be permanent, it was nevertheless within the court’s
discretion to grant the former husband “emergency” or temporary relief from the obligation). See
also McConnell v. McConnell, 552 S o. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Abdella v. Abdella, 693 So.
2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
4. When the court found that the father should not be subject to contempt
proceedings for a period of three months during his temporary unemployment, it should have
likewise suspended his payment obligation since the court had implicitly found that he lacked the
present ability to pay. Be nnett v. Dept. of Revenue, 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
5. Dept. of Revenue v. Jackson, 846 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003) held that in
instances where a parent is seeking modification of child support pa yments because he/she is
unable to pay due to incarceration, that parent may file a petition to modify with the trial court that
entered the original order; thereafter, the trial court shall hold the petition in abeyance and place
the matter on its inactive calendar for the term of the parent’s incarceration until a time when a
50
thorough evaluation of the parent’s ability to pay may be conducted, and a farsighted plan for
payment may be established. See also Travaglia v. Travaglia, 847 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003); Rock v. Dept. of Revenue, 159 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
6. Obligor is not entitled to credit against child support arrearage for amounts
spent during summer vacation or for Christmas gifts for children. Dept. of Revenue v. Jones, 689
So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
7. Trial court may not order the primary residential parent to pay support to
the non-custodial parent during a period of extended summer timesharing, without making written
findings explaining why such a dramatic deviation from the guidelines, which required only a 50%
reduction in support during extended timesharing, was required in this case. Gomez v. Gomez, 727
So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See also Wehrum v. Wehrum, 745 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA
1999).
8. The court authorized father to abate child support payments until further
court order if the mother failed to comply with court order regarding timesharing. Stanley v.
Stanley, 756 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
9. In Stanley, the father was not relieved of his common law obligation to
support his children during a period of abatement, and the court could award mother arrearage for
the period prior to the order transferring custody to father. The abatement in this case was cl early
to punish the mot her by withholding support in order to obtain compliance, and not to shield father
from his duty of support where there was no evidence that he could not pay.
10. Tinoco v. Lugo, 342 S o. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Reversing trial court
order offsetting 100% of mother’s child support obligation against father’s sizeable arrearage and
finding that the court was required to state com pelling reasons for an offset and shoul d have
considered a cap on the amount deducted from mother’s obligation to ensure the child’s needs
were met.
P. Subsequently Born or Adopted Children
1. The needs of subsequent children can only be considered in mitigation of
requests for upward modification of an existing award of child support. The parent with the duty
to support subsequently born or adopted children may raise the existen ce of such children as
justification for a deviation from the guidelines, and if so raised, the income of the other parent of
the subsequent children may be considered before determining whether there is a proper basis for
deviating from the guidelines. § 61.30(12), Florida Statutes; Dept. of Revenue v. Feeney, 689 S o.
2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Clowdis v. Earnest, 629 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993);but see Reed
v. Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 311 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Court cannot apply a Spe ed deduction
if the payor and parent of subsequent child reside together.
2. The trial court commit ted reversible error by failing to address the issue of
the father’s subsequently adopted minor children, and to consider any effect the exist ence of these
children would have on the former wife’s petition for an upward modification of child support
51
ordered for the children of the marriage of the appellant and the appellee. Locke v. Locke-Mixon,
691 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
3. Error to award child support which represented a 41% upward departure
from the guidelines amount where the only finding made in support of the deviation was that the
obligor had previously agreed to pay that same inflated amount of support for his subsequently
born child. Hice v. Pace, 675 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Subsequently born children cannot
be considered in a downward modification pursuant to § 61.30(12), Florida Statutes ; Miller-Bent
v. Miller-Bent, 680 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Dept. of Revenue v. Feeney, 689 So. 2d 350
(Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
4. Generally, the pr esence of subsequent children will not justify a deviation
from guidelines support absent special circumstances. However, serious medical problems with
the subsequent child(ren) can provide that special circumstance. Gebauer v. Dept. of Revenue, 706
So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
5. A subsequent child should not be punished for the poor planning of the
parent, and if there is a total lack of income available for the support of th e subsequent child, the
court shoul d consider that result as a factor when deciding whether to deviate downward from the
guidelines when ordering support. Robinson v. Robinson , 657 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Q. Review of Final Child Support Orders
The final judgment of modification is a final order in all respects. It is subject to
rehearing and appeal as a final order. Roshkind v. Roshkind, 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
R. Standard of Review on Appeal
Trial court’s decision on modi fication is reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard, however, statutor y factors limit that discretion. Johansson v. Johansson, 270 So. 3d 426
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019); P etrovski v. Petrovski, 342 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
III. Modification of Parenting Plans
A. Jurisdiction and Due Process
1. Young v Williams, 46 FLW D2060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) Dismissal of forme r
husband’s petition to modify parental responsibility following hearing at which former husband
was not present was reversed because service of notice to former husband’s email address w as
improper because he was not represented by counsel and did not designate and email address for
service. Service on former husband was required by mail.
2. Logreira v. Logreira, 322 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021): Trial court
violated due process and reversibly erred in signing order which granted relief beyond that
requested in pleadings. Also, wife was entitled to notice an d opportunity to be heard before trial
court sign ed order submitted by husband.
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3. Orozco v. Rodriguez-Amadeo, 321 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) Wife
denied due process where she was not given meaningful opportunity to present her case at
husband’s “emergency” Motion to suspend time sharing. Despite caption, no allegations of
emergency justified violating her due process rights and status quo on parenti ng to be maintained
until new hearing conducted.
4. Velez v. Lafontaine, 318 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) Trial court violated
due process and was without authority to change child’s school location and impose dayca re costs
on father because it was granting relief not requested in the pleadings or providing notice to the
parties.
For purposes of establishing or modifying parental responsibility and
creating, developing, approving, or modifying a parenting plan, including a
time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent’s relationship with his or
her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regar d to his
or her minor child, the best interest of the child shall be the primary
consideration. A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan,
or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a
substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a
determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.
Determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by evaluating
all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor
child and the circumstances of that family. § 61.13, Fla. Stat. (2019).
The party seeking modification “bears an ‘extraordinary burden’ to satisfy
the ‘substantial change in circumstances’ test.” Sanchez v. Hernandez, 45
So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
Modifying parenting plans beyond matters related to changes not requested
in the supplemental petition, nor to matters in which the moving party did
not present evidence on was error. The United S tates and Florida
Constitution’s guarantee the right to due process. U.S. Const. Amend. 14;
Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. A trial court violates due process when it awards
relief not sought by the pleadings. Schot v. Schot, 273 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2019), but modification allowed for a “failure to thrive” proven
allegation. Malha v. Losciales, 306 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020) – A
court is not impermissibly modifying a parenting plan when the parents
cannot r each a decision and it thereby resolves the decision. It is enforcing
the plan.
5. Talarico v. Talarico, 3 05 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) – Reversed a
modification of parenting which was not based upon an appropriate pleading; without an allegation
of finding of substantial change in circumstances; and only based on unrecorded, in camera
interview of children.
53
6. Idelson v. Carmer, 46 FLW D1451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) - Trial court
correctly observed that it need not decide whether substantial unanticipated chan ge in
circumstances occurred in order to include additional child int o parenting plane here plan
specifically stated that it could do so without need to show substantial chang e. To extent that either
party sought to modify parenting plan unrelated to additional child, court incorrectly determined
that no showing of substantial change was necessary. Passage of two years’ time and acrimony
between the parents not in and of itself enough.
7. J.G.J. v. J.H., 318 So.3d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)- Trial court erred in
modifying time sharing schedule as s anction for a contempt of custody order where no explicit
finding that change of timesharing was in best interest of the child and that a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred. Due process rights violated. See also Bruno v. Moreno, 325 So. 3d
299 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (error to modify time sharing schedule as sanction for contempt when
this was not requested an d no findings were made as to the children’s best interests).
8. Roberts v. Diaz, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D 1548 (Fla. 3d DCA July 20, 2022) –
Father’s due process rights not violated when the court adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan
after hearing on Father’s Petition for Modification.
9. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 335 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) -Violation
of due process to enter a parenting plan which substantially reduced the Father’s summer
timesharing when neither party requested such relief. See also Ceballos v. Barreto, 337 So. 2d 69
(Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
B. Temporary Parenting Plans
1. Modify Temporary Parenting Plans – Trial court not required to find a
substantial change of circumstances in order to modify a temporary custody order. Riddle v. Riddle
and The Plank Factory, I nc., 214 S o. 3d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
2. Burden of Proof to Modify Temporary Order. Section 61.14(11)(a), Florida
Statutes provides that the court may, “upon good cause shown” and without a showing of a
substantial change in circ umstances, modify, vacate, or set aside a tempora ry pa renting order.
3. Temporary timesharing order requiring supervised timesharin g must set
forth steps to obtain unsupervised timesharing.
4. Standard of Review: A buse of Discretion Standard. The o rder must be
based on competent, substantial evidence.
C. Permanent Parenting Plans
1. Burden of Proof:
54
a. Substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances
AND
b. Modification is in the best interest of the child.
c. § 61.13(3), Florida Statutes, provides, “For purposes of establishing
or modifying parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or modifying a
parenting plan, including a timesharing schedule, which governs each parent’s relationship
with his or her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his or
her minor child, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. A
determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may
not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change of
circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.
Determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by evaluating all of the factors
affecting the welfare and int erests of the particular minor child and the circumstances of
that family, including but not limited to…..” and the statute then lists 20 factors as (a)
through (t ).
d. Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 933-34 (Fl a. 2005); see also
Jannotta v. Hess, 959 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So.
2d 928, 933-34 (Fla. 2005)). “Stated differently, a movant must show that (1)
circumstances have substantially and materially changed since the original custody
determination, (2) the change w as not reasonably contemplated by the parties, an d (3) the
child’s best interests justify changing custody.” Reed v. Reed, 182 So. 3d 837 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2016) (citing Wade, 903 So. 2d at 931 n.2). Sanabria v. Sanabria, 271 So. 3d 1101
(Fla. 3rd DCA 2019) There is no presumption for or a gainst relocation.
e. See Mignott v. Mignott, 337 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) –
Reversing grant of relocation petition where no evidence the trial court evaluated any of
the statutory factors.
2. Extraordinary Burden.
a. The First District referred to the burden to prove a substantial change
of circumstances as “extraordinary.” Korkmaz v. Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA
2016) (citing Bon v. Rivera, 10 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)); Bartolotta v. Bartolotta,
687 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Other courts have recently reminded litigants that
the burden to prove a substantial change of circumstances is “extraordinary.” George v.
Lull, 181 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (The extraordinary burden in showing a
substantial unanticipated change in circumstances provides stability to the original
timesharing plan which is intended to preclude disrupti on in the lives of children by
preventing frequent disputes over the plan); Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 163 So. 3d 560
(Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Kyle v. Carter, 290 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) – conclusory
allegations and not ultimate facts requires dismissal.
b. Korkmaz cit es prior cases that held a parent requesting the
modification must establish more than “an acrimoni ous relationship and a lack of ef fective
55
communication in order to show a substantial change” of circumstances. Sanchez v.
Hernandez, 45 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 954 So. 2d 698
(Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that the inability of parents to communicate does not amount
to a substantial change of circumstances); McKinnon v. Staats, 899 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2005)(same); Ring v. Ring, 834 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (concluding that the
parties’ failur e to communicate and their continued hostility did not constitute a material
change in circumstances). In fact, even when one parent fails to keep the other parent
apprised of a child’s activities, this type of communication problem— in and of itself—is
insufficient to establish a material change in circumstances for purposes of a modification
order. Sanchez, 45 So. 3d at 62.
c. The Korkmaz opinion reads, in part, as follow: In his Amend ed
Supplemental Petition for Modification, the former husband alleges that the former wife
has alienated him from his daughter and attempted to undermine his relationship with his
child. In support of these conclusory stat ements, he details a mul tiplicity of c ommunication
and cooperation issues and references events that indicate a rancorous and hostile
relationship betwe en the parties. While, if true, the former husband’s specific factual
allegations are certainly troubling, they are insufficient to meet the ‘extraordinary burden’
of constituting the type of substantial and material chan ge that warrants the granting of a
modification order. Sanchez, 45 So. 3d at 62 (viewing the father’s allegations in a light
most favorable to the father showed that the mother did have difficulty communicating
with the father regarding decisions involving the child and displ ayed hostility toward him,
but “[t]he father . . . n eeded to prove more than merely an acrimonious relationship and a
lack of effective communication in order to show a substantial change”); Bazane v.
Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that “[t]he parents’ acrimonious
relationship and lack of effective communication [did] not constitute a material change in
circumstances to warrant modification of custody.”); accord Ragle v. Ragle, 82 So. 3d 109,
113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“It is abundantly clear from the pleadings, the custody
evaluation, and the Statement of Proceedings that the primary problem was the parents’
refusal to adequately communicate and cooperate. While this may have been exacerbated
by Appellant’s minor relocation, this is not sufficient to raise this to the level of a
substantial change in circumstances”).
d. The First District’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of a
petition to modify that was based upon allegations of alienation and poor
communication/cooperation between the parents in Korkmaz v. Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d 263
(Fla. 1st DCA 2016) is not surprising given the long line of cases that have held that it
takes more than an acrimonious relationship to prove a substantial change of circumstances
to warrant modi fication. Blevins v. Blevins, 172 So. 3d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Sanchez
v. Hernandez, 45 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Ragle v. Ragle, 82 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2011); Ogilvie v. Ogil vie, 954 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); McKinnon v. Staats,
899 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Cooper v. Gress, 854 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003);
Chapman v. Prevatt, 845 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Light v. K irkland, 311 So. 3d
896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) - by tying the child’s poor school performance to the parents’
acrimonious behavior, the court considered an impermissible factor to its modification.
56
e. Relocation of 45 miles does not meet substanti al change of
circumstances for modification. Hollis v. Hollis, 276 So.3d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
f. Meyers v. Meyers, 295 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) – Parents
engaging in domestic violence in front of their children constitutes an unanticipated
material and substantial change in circumstances supporting modification of a timesharing
arrangement.
g. Thomas v. Joseph, 280 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) – Final
Judgment establishing parentage, timesharing, and child support had precedential value
and court could not fail to recognize a parent’s status without a determination that
modification is in the best interest of the child under Privette 617 So. 2d 30 5 (Fla 1993).
h. Cheval ier v. Chevalier, 300 So. 3d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) Trial
court erred in entering post judgment contempt order awarding father 100% of timesharing
and ordering mothe r to complete an intensive series of therapeutic steps to restore mother’s
unsupervised timesharing where timesharing was already established by final divorce
orders and the parties’ petitions to permanently modify timesharing were pending and
father did not plead an emergency.
i. R.S. v S.K., 313 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) – Sexual abuse of
parties’ child by mother’s husband was substantial, material, and unanticipated change in
circumstances and it was not necessary to prove that change in circumstances resulted in
substantial or permanent harm to child.
j. P.D.V-G. v B.A.V-G, 320 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) Finding
of substantial change in circumstances is supported by former wife’s behaviors, her
relationship with her boyfriend and removal of children from former wife’s “temporary
care” during a dependency case.
k. Villalba v. Villalba, 316 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), No error
in granting motion to dismiss petition to modify timesharing and child support with
prejudice as availability of an additional room in residence did not constitute a material,
substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances.
l. Patel v. Patel, 324 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) No substantial
unanticipated change in circumstances for which to modify parenting plan when the record
did not reflect that scheduling challenges r elated to Husband’s work were not substantially
different than when the parties divorced.
m. Daniello v. Settle, 336 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) Moth er’s
sobriety is not a substantial change in circumstances to allow modification of timesharing,
and because her sobriety began less than two we eks after the agreed final judgment was
entered, it was not a chan ge that would not have been reasonably contemplated at the time
of the original judgment.
D. Venue to Modify Parenting Plan
57
1. § 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that the proper venue for an action
to modify a parenting plan is, “the circuit court in the county in which either parent, and the child
reside or the circuit court in which the original order approving or creating the parenting plan was
entered. The court may change venue in accordance with s. 47.122.”
2. Venue to Establish a Foreign Judgment. Section 47.011, Florida Statutes
applies to actions to establish a foreign decree as a Florida judgment. The statute provides that
“actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action
accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. Nunez-Miller v. Miller, 209 So. 3d 619 (Fla.
5th DCA 2017).
E. Modifying Supervised Timesharing to Unsupervised
1. Temporary. An order requiring that a parent’s timesharing be supervised
must set forth steps to obtain unsupervised timesharing. Curial e v. C uriale, 220 So. 3d 554 (Fla.
2d DCA 2017) (reversing and remanded to set forth the steps the mother must take to reestablish
unsupervised timesharing). T.D. v. K.F., 283 So. 3d 943 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2019).
In Curiale, the order on appeal was a temporary timesharing order. Therefore, upon
remand and the trial court establishing the steps the mother must take to modify the temporary
order, thereafter, upon satisfying those steps, the mother could merely file a Motion to Modify and
would not be required to show a substantial change of circumstances, but merely “good cause” for
modifying the temporary parenting order.
2. Permanent Parenting Plan. C.N. v I.G.C. 316 So.3d 287 (Fla. 2021) The
Florida Supreme Court has resolved the conflict in the districts and determined that a final
judgment modifying a preexisting parenting plan is not legally deficient simply for failing to give
specific steps to restore lost timesharing. The Supreme Court specifically does not address the
correctness of the 5
th
District’s holding that Florida Statutes do not authorize trial court to include
such “key to the gate” steps in modifying a parenting plan.
3. Barrack v. Barrack, 323 So.3d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) No “key to the
gate” necessary when requiring supervised visitation. Cannot delegate to a parent and her selected
therapist the authority to reestablish the other parent’s parenting time.
4. Nicholas v. Grant, 330 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) – Party must
specifically request change from supervised to unsupervised visitation in Petition for Modification.
F. En forceability of Foreign Decree of Grandparent Visitation
1. Mr. Strinko appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his petition to domesticate
and modify an Ohio judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal relied upon Ledoux-Nottingham
v. Downs, 210 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2017) in which the Florida Supreme Court held that Full Faith
and Credit, rather than comity principles, governs the domestication and enforcement of the
judgement of a sister state of competent jurisdiction. The court further held that despite Florida’s
58
privacy laws and their effect on grandparent visitation, the properly domesticated judgment of a
sister state allowing grandparent visitation is enforceable in Florida. Strinko v. Strinko, 225 So.
3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 201 7).
2. If it is enforceable, isn’t it therefore modifiable? It appears that the
grandfather had filed a petition to domesticate and modif y the foreign decree. The opinion does
not address what the grandfather w as attempting to modify since he already had grandparent
visitation. The Third District held it was enforceable but does not address whether it is modifiable.
If it is enforceable under Full Faith and Credit, is it not modifiable?
3. One may conclude that a parent may not file a petition to domesticate and
modify a foreign decree granting grandparent visitation seeking to eliminate the grandparent
visitation on the basis that the foreign decree violates Florida’s privacy laws. The Supreme Court
specifically disapproved the decision of the Second District in Fazzini v. Davis, 98 So. 3d 98 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012) to the extent that it holds that Florida’s public policy may p rovide an exception to
the full faith and credit due judgments of sister states. Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 210 So. 3d
1217 (Fla. 2017).
G. No Prospective Relocation
1. Trial court erred by holding that a parent could relocate at some point in the
future from Texa s to any other state in the continental United States without meeting the
requirements of section 61.13001, Florida Statutes. Horn v. Horn, 225 So. 3d 292 (Fl a. 1st DCA
2017); see also Arthur v. Arthur, 54 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 2010); Purin v. Purin, 158 So. 3d 752(Fla.
2d DCA 2015); Paris v. Butler, 264 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2019).
2. Miller v. Miller, 277 So. 3d 725 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) – great dissent
regarding best interests of the child on a prospective based analysis.
3. Amiot v. Olmstead, 321 So.3d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) – Trial court abused
its discretion by including conditional provisions for timesharing should former wife relocate her
residence again in the future.
IV. MODIFICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INJUNCTIONS:
Injunctions may contain provisions regarding support, parenting, or both.
A. Burden to Dissolve Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence
1. A party seeking a dissolution of an injunction must demonstrate that the
scenario underlying the injunction no longer exists so that the continuation of the injunction would
serve no valid purpose. Noe v. Noe, 217 So. 3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (citing Alkhoury v.
Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)); see also Hamane v. Elofir, 226 So. 3d 330
(Fla. 5th DCA 2017); Ba k v. Bak, 332 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).
59
2. A party opposing the dissolution of the inj unction must demonstrate that he
or she “reasonably maintains a fear of becoming a victim of domestic violence.” Noe v. Noe, 217
So. 3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (citing Alkoury v. Alkoury, 54 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011));
see also Labrake v. Labrake, 335 So. 3d 214 (Fl a. 1st DCA 2022).
3. Noe v. Noe, 217 So. 3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017): Incar cerated movant files
a motion to dissolve an injunction for protection against domestic violence that had been entered
15 years prior. The injunction was entered when the movant and the appellee were married, and
the appellee was pregnant. Injunction was entered, parties divorced, child was born, and parties
complied with injunction for several months. Notwithstanding the injunction, the parties began
having contact and the ap pellee b ecame pregnant with twins. One twin died and one survived and
the parties continued to reside together due to, per appellee’s testimony, financial constraints, and
the medical needs of the surviving twin. The appell ee did eventually leave after the appellant
disconnected the baby’s heart monitor, resulting in a life-threatening situation. The appellee was
incarcerated beginning in 2010 and he’d had no contact with the appellant since that time, but his
sentences was going to expire in less than 5 years. Appellee testified that she feared for he r safety
based upon his vindictive feelings towards her and his habit of reappearing in her life just when
she thought he was gone. His parental ri ghts to the child were terminated in 2005.
4. The First District Court of Appeal specifically stated that, “Undoubtedl y,
many circumstances have changed since the entry of the injunction in February of 2000. Appellant
asserts his incarceration and resulting years of no-contact with Appellee are sufficient enough to
entitle him to a dissolution of the injunction. However, he relies on only part of the proof
required.”
5. The First District concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
denying the incarcerated movant’s petition to dissolve the injunction by concluding, based upon
the facts presented, that the injunction still serves a valid purpose.
6. Trial court erred denying former husband’s motion to dissolve permanent
domestic violence injunction issued against him six years prior.
When the domestic violence
injunction was originally issued in 2011, it was justified by the former wife’s testimony that after
she filed for divorce and both were emplo yed in the mi litary, the former husband confronted her
in their marital home and threatened to shoot her. Those events led to criminal charges against
him; however, the evidence at the 2017 hearing on the motion to dissolve showed a significant
change from the circumstances because (1) the former husband had been acquitted of the criminal
charges arising out of the event s that supported the entry of the permanent injunction; (2) their
marriage had been dissolved; (3) former husband was living in Kansas, not Florida; (4) former
wife was living in Japan, not Florida; (5) he was no longer employed in the military, while she
was; (6) the parties had not seen each other in six years; and (7) he had made no attempt to contact
her for six years. Nothing in the record suggests that she will return to anywhere close to where
the former husband lives, and the injunction is preventing him from finding employment in law
enforcement or security in Kansas. The trial court’s conclusion could only have rested on a
theoretical possibility tha t former husband —after s ix years with no attempt at contact, living far
away, and no longer sharing marriage or employment with former wife — might someday seek
her out and harm her. There was no competent substantial evidence in the record to support such
a finding. Former wife’s fear was of an incident was merely speculative fear of future violence and
60
cannot be enough to justify the never-ending existence of an injunction. Trice v. Trice, 267 So. 3d
496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019 ).
7. Reversal of Denial of Motion to Dissolve Injunction. Green v. Bordiuk, 344
So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of the fifth attempt
in six years to modify or dissolve an injunction. The woman protected by the injunction no longer
feared being a victim of domestic violence and neither party bound by the injunction wanted it to
continue. Appellate court therefore revers ed and remanded the case with instructions to dissolve
the injunction.
B. Standard of Review
1. The standard of r eview is abuse of discretion. Noe v. Noe, 217 So. 3d 196
(Fla. 1
st
DCA 2017).
2. Trial court has broad discretion in granting, denying, dissolving, or
modifying an injunction unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Simonik v. Patterson,
752 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
3. Especially true when there is live testimony. Shierling v. Hall, 67 So. 3d
251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010 ).
4. Spaulding v. Shane, 150 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (motion to dissolve
granted when movant’s release from prison was decades aw ay).
5. Baker v. Baker, 112 So. 3d 734 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (motion to dissolve
granted when movant’s release was also decades away).
6. Hobbs v. Hobbs, 290 So. 3d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) – reversed trial court
denial of motion to dissolve twenty-year-old injunction against domestic violence. Wife’s “mere
speculation” is le gally insufficient “to justify the never- ending existence of an injunction”.
C. Entitlement to Hearing on Motion to Dissolve if Motion Legally Sufficient
Alston v. Haines, 215 So. 3d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). Mr. Alston moved to
vacate the injunction for repeat violence claiming that due to his 10-year sentence for incarceration
on unrelated charges, his circumstances had changed. He claimed that the injunction was
preventing his participation in “courses and education classes, rehabilitative programs, jobs,
transferring to certain facilities.” Trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The court held,
“….an evidentiary hearing is required on a motion to modify or dissolve an injunction when the
motion is legally sufficient.” Alst on v. Haines, 215 So. 3d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing
Bennett v. Abdo, 167 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)); Raymonvil v. Lewis, 46 So. 3d 139 (Fla.
5th DCA 2010); Cf. Woolley v. Nelson, 183 So. 3d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that a hearing
was required on a moti on to dissolve an injunction when an inmate alleged injunction was
preventing him from obtaining a lower custod y level, taking advantage of rehabilitation programs,
or transferring to a facility closer to home).
61
V. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Aarts v. Aarts, 636 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ....................................................................... 49
Abdella v. Abdella, 693 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).............................................................. 49
Adkins v. Sotolongo, 197 So. 3d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)......................................................... 46
Agliano v. Agliano, 605 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ............................................................. 19
Albu v. Albu, 150 So. 3d 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) .................................................................... 11
Alexander v. Alexander, 683 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)..................................................... 45
Alfrey v. Alfrey, 553 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).................................................................. 36
Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) .................................................. 58
Allison v. Allison, 554 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ............................................................... 4
Allison v. Allison, 692 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)............................................................. 14
Alston v. Haines, 215 So. 3d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).............................................................. 60
Alvarado v. Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Alvarado, 194 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ................. 37
Amoroso v. Phister, 689 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) .......................................................... 35
Anderson v. Anderson, 155 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).......................................................... 9
Anderson v. Anderson, 609 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)......................................................... 45
Anderson v. Durham, 162 So.3d 65 (Fla. 1
st
DCA 2014)............................................................. 21
Andrews v. Andrews, 712 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) .......................................................... 36
Anthony v. Snell, 630 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ................................................................ 30
Antonini v. Antonini, 473 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ............................................................ 8
Arthur v. Arthur, 54 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 2010) ................................................................................. 58
Athey v. Athey, 849 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) .................................................................... 17
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 2015) ......................................................................... 26
Bacon v. Bacon, 956 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ................................................................. 8
Bagley v. Bagley, 948 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ............................................................... 25
Bain v. Bain, 687 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) .................................................................. 20, 21
Bak v. Bak, 332 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)....................................................................... 58
Baker v. Baker, 112 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ................................................................... 60
Banyas v. Banyas, 704 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).............................................................. 45
Bardol v. Martin, 763 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ............................................................. 44
Bartolotta v. Bartolotta, 687 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ........................................ 54
Bator v. Osborne, 983 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ............................................................. 40
Batts v. Batts, 600 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)................................................................... 44
Bauchman v. Bauchman, 253 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ................................................. 22
Bazane v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ........................................................... 55
Becker v. Beck er, 720 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ............................................................. 11
Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1991) ...................................................................... 7, 8, 12
Befanis v. Befanis, 293 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) ........................................................... 22
Benedict v. Benedict, 181 So. 3d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ......................................................... 28
Bennett v. Abdo, 167 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)................................................................. 60
Bennett v. Dept. of Revenue, 664 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)................................ 6, 20, 41, 49
Benson v. Benson, 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)................................
................................ 13
Berki v. Berki, 636 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)............................................................ 14
Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ..................................... 8, 35, 43
Birkmire v. Birkmire, 219 So. 3d 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)......................................................... 46
62
Bish v. Bish, 404 So. 2d 840, 840-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) .......................................................... 43
Blevins v. Blevins, 172 So. 3d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).............................................................. 55
Blumberg v. Blumberg, 561 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)..................................................... 14
Bon v. Rivera, 10 So. 3d 193, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) .............................................................. 54
Bonavito v. Bonavito, 958 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)......................................................... 31
Borchard v. Borchard, 730 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)........................................................ 17
Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1997) ................................................................................ 27
Brito v. Brito, 804 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)...................................................................... 19
Brock v. Brock, 682 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) .................................................................. 14
Brock v. Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) .................................................................. 10
Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) .............................................................. 35
Brown v. Brown, 629 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ................................................................. 8
Bruce v. Bruce, 243 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) .................................................................. 26
Bruno v. Moreno, 325 So. 3d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)................................................................ 53
Buhler v. Buhler, 83 So. 3d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) ................................................................. 38
Bunassar v. Diaz, 804 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)................................................................ 42
Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) ........................................................... 41
Burkhart v. Burkhart, 731 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)......................................................... 27
Butler v. Brewster, 629 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)........................................................... 45
Butler v. Butler, 622 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) .................................................................... 47
C.N. v I.G.C. 316 So.3d 287 (Fla. 2021)....................................................................................... 57
Calahan v. Calahan, 979 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)............................................................ 3
Calderon v. Calderon, 730 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ....................................................... 47
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) ....................................................... 8, 13, 14
Castleberry v. Morgan, 974 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)...................................................... 45
Ceballos v. Barreto, 337 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)............................................................. 53
Chapman v. Chapman, 638 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)..................................................... 45
Chapman v. Prevatt, 845 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).......................................................... 55
Chapoteau v. Chapoteau, 659 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ................................................. 40
Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954).............................................................................. 3
Cheek v. Hesik, 157 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)................................................................. 32
Chevalier v. Chevalier, 300 So. 3d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)...................................................... 56
Cleary v. Cleary, 743 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ......................................................... 3, 22
Clowdis v. Earnest, 629 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ........................................................... 50
Cohen v. Cohen, 637 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) .................................................................. 14
Collingsworth v. Collingsworth, 624 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ........................................ 14
Conness v. Conness, 607 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) .......................................................... 36
Cooper v. Gress, 854 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ................................................................ 55
Cortina v. Cortina. 98 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1957) ............................................................................ 1, 2
Cowie v. Cowie, 564 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).................................................................... 5
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 499 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ............................................ 18
Curiale v. Curiale, 220 So. 3d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).............................................................. 57
Dale v. Dale, 714 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)...................................................................... 47
Damiano v. Damiano, 855 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ....................................................... 10
Daniel v. Moats, 718 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ................................................................ 40
Daniello v. Settle, 336 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ............................................................ 56
63
Davis v. Davis, 691 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)................................................................... 17
Denny v. Denny, 334 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)................................................................... 4
Dept. of Revenue v. Beal, 672 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)................................................... 46
Dept. of Revenue v. Dodge, 647 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ................................................ 43
Dept. of Revenue v. Feeney, 689 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ......................................... 50, 51
Dept. of Revenue v. Fisher, 738 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)................................................ 45
Dept. of Revenue v. Heirholzer, 708 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).................................... 42, 49
Dept. of Revenue v. Jackson, 846 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003) ...................................................... 41, 49
Dept. of Revenue v. Jones, 689 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ............................................... 50
Dept. of Revenue v. Kaiser, 890 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ............................................... 43
Dept. of Revenue v. Llamas, 196 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ............................................ 41
Dept. of Revenue v. Thomas, 659 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ........................................... 39
Dept. of Revenue v. Watt, 681 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ................................................... 45
Dept. of Revenue v. Wilson, 782 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)................................................ 44
Dey v. Dey, 838 So. 2d 6 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ......................................................................... 31
Dippold v. Dippold, 712 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) ......................................................... 11
Dixon v. Dixon, 233 So.3d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)............................................................ 37, 47
Dogoda v. Dogoda, 233 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)............................................................... 4
Donoff v. Donoff, 940 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ............................................................. 25
Donovan v. Donovan, 200 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ........................................................ 12
Draper v. Draper, 604 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ............................................................... 18
Dunn v. Dunn, 277 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). ................................................................ 13
Edgar v. Edgar, 668 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ................................................................ 47
Eisemann v. Eisemann, 5 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)............................................................. 8
Ellis v. Ellis, 699 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997)....................................................................... 17
Ellisen v. Ellisen, 150 So. 3d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)............................................................... 2
Emmel v. Emmel, 671 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) ......................................................... 11, 19
England v. England, 520 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) ...................................................... 9, 11
Ervin v. Chason, 750 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)................................................................. 49
Ervin v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 152 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)........................................ 46
Essex v. Ayres, 503 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) .................................................................. 48
Eyster v. Eyster, 503 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) .................................................................. 7
Fabio v. Monell, 594 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) .......................................................... 27, 34
Farley v. Farley, 858 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ....................................................... 7
Farrior v. Farrior, 488 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ............................................................ 15
Faulk v. Dept. of Revenue, 157 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)................................................. 29
Fayson v. Fayson, 482 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).............................................................. 44
Fazzini v. Davis, 98 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ..................................................................... 58
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 314 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020)................................................... 29
Ferraro v. Ferraro, 891 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)..................................................... 18, 37
Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So. 2d. 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ........................................................... 18
Finley v. Scott, 707 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1998).................................................................................. 37
Fischer v. Fischer, 195 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)............................................................. 1
Fischer v. Fischer, 221 So. 3d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ............................................................. 3
Fleischmann v. Fleischmann, 868 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ................................................ 43
Floyd v. Floyd, 393 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)...................................................................... 36
64
Ford v. Ford, 816 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ................................................................... 48
Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1956)........................................................................................... 5
Frankel v. Ellerin, 684 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ............................................................... 1
Frantz v. Frantz, 453 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ................................................................... 7
Freeman v. Freeman, 615 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) .................................................. 35, 41
French v. French, 4 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ...................................................................... 26
Friedman v. Friedman, 508 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).............................................. 30
Galperin v. Galperin, 862 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ..................................................... 46
Garcia-Lawson v. Lawson, 211 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)................................ ................ 30
Gardiner v. Gardiner, 705 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ..................................................... 20
Gardner v. Gardner, 692 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ............................................................ 9
Garrett v. Garrett, 707 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ............................................................. 45
Gebauer v. Dept. of Revenue, 706 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)............................................ 51
Gelber v. Brydger, 248 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ............................................................. 4
George v. Lull, 181 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)................................................................ ... 54
Gibbs v. Gibbs, 320 So. 3d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)..................................................................... 6
Gillespie v. Holdsworth, 333 So. 3d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ..................................................... 41
Goff v. Kenny-Goff, 145 So. 3d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)............................................................ 30
Golden v. Bass, 194 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ................................................................ 31
Gomez v. Gomez, 727 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ............................................................. 50
Goodwin v. Goodwin, 640 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) .......................................................... 8
Gore v. Smith, 306 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020).................................................................... 43
Grady v. Grady, 640 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) .................................................................. 39
Green v. Bordiuk, 344 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ............................................................... 60
Grobleski v. Grobleski, 489 So. 2d 104, 105-06 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ......................................... 30
Gruber v. Gruber, 857
So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)............................................................... 20
Guadine v. Guadine, 474 So. 2d 1245 (Fla.4th DCA 1985)......................................................... 48
Gurdian v. Gurdian, 198 So. 3d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).............................................................. 27
H.R.N. v. S.D.L., 227 So. 3d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ................................................................. 46
H.R.S. v. Christman, 635 So. 2d 94 (Fla.1st DCA 1994) ............................................................. 46
Hale v. Hale, 567 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)....................................................................... 35
Hamane v. Elofir, 226 So. 3d 330 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) .............................................................. 58
Hanskat v. Hanskat, 716 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ......................................................... 3, 5
Harper v. Harper, 848 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ............................................................. 30
Hartley v. Hartley, 134 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)................................................................ 2
Hastings v. Hastings, 841 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).......................................................... 29
Helling v. Bartok, 987 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ............................................................... 27
Henderson v. Henderson, 619 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) .................................................. 36
Hernandez v. Hernandez, 335 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) .................................................. 53
Hice v. Pace, 675 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ...................................................................... 51
Hillier v. Iglesias, 901 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) .............................................................. 11
Hitt v. Hitt, 571 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)............................................................................. 9
Holder v. Lopez, 274 So. 3d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)................................................................. 23
Hollis v. Hollis, 276 So.3d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)................................................................ ...... 56
Hollonbeck v. Hollonbeck, 279 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)................................................. 46
Horn v. Horn, 225 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)................................ ..................................... 58
65
Hosseni v. Hosseni, 564 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ............................................................ 37
HRS v. Puglia, 600 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) .................................................................... 28
Hulse v. Hulse, 873 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ................................................................... 18
Hunter v. Hunter, 626 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ............................................................. 37
Hybart v. Hybart, 638 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) .............................................................. 14
Ibanez v. Salazar, 459 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ............................................................... 43
Idelson v. Carmer, 46 FLW D1451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ............................................................. 53
Ingrahm v. Ingrahm, 711 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ........................................................ 32
Ispass v. Ispass, 243 So.3d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ............................................................ 16, 19
Israel v. Israel, 874 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ................................................................... 32
Ivonovich v. Valladarez, 190 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ................................................... 39
J.G.J. v. J.H., 318 So.3d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ....................................................................... 53
Jane v. Fero, 678 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) ...................................................................... 35
Jannotta v. Hess, 959 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ........................................................ 54
Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ............................................................ 3, 6
Jess v. Dept. of Revenue, 711 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) .................................................. 33
Johansson v. Johansson, 270 So. 3d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ............................................. 35, 51
Johnson v. Johnson, 537 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) .............................................................. 3
Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ................................................................... 36
Joyce v. Joyce, 563 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ................................................................. 17
Judy v. Judy, 291 So. 3d 651 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2020) ..................................................................... 13
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 744 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ............................................................ 38
Kartzmark v. Kartzmark, 709 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ..................................................... 8
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 541 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ........................................................... 9
Keeley v. Keeley, 899 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ................................................................. 38
Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1994) ......................................................... 1, 13, 14
Kerle v. Kerle, 700 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) .................................................................... 44
Kersh v. Kersh, 613 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) .................................................................. 36
Kidd v. Kidd, 695 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ...................................................................... 18
Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) ..................................................... 14
Kirkland v. Kirkland, 618 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ......................................................... 27
Kitchens v. Kitchens, 4 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ................................................................. 23
Klokow v. Klokow, 323 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) ............................................................. 26
Knapp v. Knapp, 778 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) ................................................................. 43
Knight v. Knight, 702 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ............................................................... 42
Knowlton v. Knowlton, 282 So. 3d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)....................................................... 42
Koch v. Koch, 47 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ......................................................................... 1
Korkmaz v. Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ................................................... 54, 55
Krause v. Krause, 793 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ............................................................. 2, 44
Ksaibati v. Ksaibati, 824 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ............................................................. 2
Kuchera v. Kuchera, 983 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) .......................................................... 19
Kuczwanski v. Kuczwanski, 602 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ............................................... 12
Kuttas v. Ritter, 879 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004 ........................................................................ 38
Kyle v. Carter, 290 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) .................................................................... 54
Labrake v. Labrake, 335 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ........................................................... 59
66
Laliberte v. Laliberte, 698 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) .................................................. 5, 39
Lamancusa v. Dept. of Revenue, 250 So.3d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ........................................ 33
Landow v. Landow, 824 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ........................................................... 17
Larger v. Diaz, 595 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) .................................................................. 28
Larwa v. Department of Revenue, 169 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ................................... 29
Layman v. Layman, 738 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ............................................................ 49
League v. Tassiter, 536 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ............................................................. 35
Ledbetter v. Bell, 698 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ............................................................. 40
Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 163 So. 3d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) .......................................... 54
Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 210 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2017) .................................................. 57, 58
Leibowitz v. Leibowitz, 611 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ...................................................... 30
Leonard v. Leonard, 971 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ........................................................... 20
Lester v. Lester, 736 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ............................................................... 48
Levin v. Levin, 613 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ............................................................... 6, 39
Levinson v. Levinson, 895 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) .................................................... 7, 29
Lewis v. Lewis, 450 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) .................................................................. 48
Lewis v. Lewis, 667 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ................................................................... 47
Linstroth v. Dorgan, 2 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) .............................................................. 12
Livingston v. Livingston, 686 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) .............................................. 34, 45
Llopis v. Llopis, 731 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) .................................................................... 9
Locke v. Locke-Mixon, 691 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ........................................................ 51
Logreira v. Logreira, 322 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) .......................................................... 51
Lopez v. Lopez, 970 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ................................................................... 22
Loss v. Loss, 714 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)....................................................................... 9
Loza v. Marin, 198 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)................................................................... 29
Mackaravitz v. Mackaravitz, 710 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ......................................... 18, 19
Mackay v. Mechetti, 695 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)........................................................... 10
Mahle v. Mahle, 341 So. 3d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ................................................................. 21
Malha v. Losciales, 306 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020) ......................................................... 52
Mann v. Mann, 523 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) .................................................................... 14
Manning v. Manning, 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ....................................................... 49
Martin v. Robbins, 194 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2016) ....................................................... 25, 26
Martland v. Arabia, 987 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ........................................................... 45
Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ..................................................... 40, 41
McClain v. Karll, 686 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ............................................................... 48
McConnell v. McConnell, 552 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) .............................................. 5, 49
McCormick v. Boyd, 693 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) .......................................................... 29
McDaniels v. McDaniels, 278 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ................................................... 12
McDowell v. McDowell, 770 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ............................................ 44, 45
McGrath v. Caron, 8 So. 3d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) .............................................................. 31
McKinnon v. Staats, 899 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ........................................................... 55
McManus v. McManus, 638 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) .................................................... 22
Mekhaiel v. Messiha, 643 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) .......................................................... 2, 8
Metzler v. Metzler, 356 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) .............................................................. 3
Meyers v. Meyers, 295 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ............................................................. 56
67
Mignott v. Mignott, 337 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) ............................................................. 54
Millan v. Millan, 241 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ................................................................. 27
Miller v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) .................................................................. 13
Miller v. Schou, 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1993) ................................................................................. 43
Miller-Bent v. Miller-Bent, 680 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ........................................ 47, 51
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 536 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)......................................................... 10
Moniz v. Moniz, 979 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ............................................................... 23
Moody v. Moody, 721 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ............................................................... 31
Morgan v. Morgan, 590 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)............................................................ 27
Morin v. Morin, 466 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)..................................................... 27, 33, 34
Murphy v. Murphy, 201 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) ............................................................... 25
Myer v. Kaye, 990 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)................................................................... 49
Myers v. Lane, 283 So. 3d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ................................................................... 38
Nangle v. Nangle, 286 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) .............................................................. 23
Natoli v. Natoli, 641 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) .................................................................. 27
Nerney v. Nerney, 752 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ............................................................... 38
Ness v. Martinez, 249 So.3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)................................................................. 47
Neumann v. Neumann, 857 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ................................................. 2
Newman v. Weber, 715 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ............................................................. 43
Newnum v. Newnum, 715 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ......................................................... 41
Nicholas v. Grant, 330 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)............................................................... 57
Niemann v. Anderson, 834 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ....................................................... 35
Noe v. Noe, 217 So. 3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)............................................................. 58, 59, 60
Nowell v. Nowell, 634 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ............................................................... 11
Nunez-Miller v. Miller, 209 So. 3d 619 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)...................................................... 57
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 892 Fl. 5th
DCA 2022.................................................................................. 28
Ogilvie v. Ogilvie, 954 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) .............................................................. 55
Olsen v. Olsen, 964 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)................................................................... 22
O'Neal v. O'Neal, 410 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)............................................................. 14
Orozco v. Rodriguez-Amadeo, 321 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)............................................ 52
Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1997)................................................................... passim
Overcash v. Overcash, 466 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)...................................................... 33
P.D.V-G. v B.A.V-G, 320 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)........................................................... 56
Pagano v. Hunt, 745 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)................................................................... 5
Patel v. Patel, 324 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)................................................................... 56
Paulette v. Rosella, 267 So. 3d 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ...................................................... 37, 43
Paulsen v. Paulsen, 603 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).................................................... 15, 16
Petrovski v. Petrovski, 342 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ....................................................... 51
Pettry v. Pettry, 706 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).................................................................... 4
Pettry v. Pettry, 768 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).................................................................. 4, 15
Phagan v. McDuffee, 296 So. 3d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) ......................................................... 29
Pill v. Pill, 583 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)........................................................................ 25
Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992) .................................................................. 3, 17, 21, 22
Pitcher v. Waldo, 103 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ....................................................... 30
Pitts v. Pitts, 626 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ........................................................... 20, 42, 44
Pohlmann v. Pohlmann, 703 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) .................................................. 43
68
Pollack v. Pollack, 181 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ........................................................... 26
Pollack v. Pollack, 722 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)......................................................... 4, 14
Poyner v. Smith, 693 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)................................................................. 44
Pratt v. Pratt, 645 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)............................................................ 4, 17, 19
Pribble v. Pribble, 800 So. 2d 743 (Fla 5th DCA 2001) .............................................................. 40
Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).................................................................. 13
R.S. v S.K . , 313 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) .......................................................................... 56
Radziwon v. Radziwon, 710 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)...................................................... 27
Ragle v. Ragle, 82 So. 3d 109, 113 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ............................................................. 55
Rahn v. Rahn, 768 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ..................................................................... 5
Rao v. Rao, 501 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ....................................................................... 4
Ray v. Ray, 707 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) .............................................................. 17, 18, 27
Raymonvil v. Lewis, 46 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)............................................................. 60
Reed v. Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 311 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)................................................. 50
Reed v. Reed, 182 So. 3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ............................................................. 54
Reep v. Reep, 565 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) ........................................................................ 5
Regan v. Regan, 217 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)............................................................... 6, 21
Reid v. Reid, 396 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)....................................................................... 14
Rentz v. Rentz, 535 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)..................................................................... 13
Richter v. Richter, 666 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).............................................................. 35
Riddle v. Riddle and The Plank Factory, Inc., 214 S o. 3d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) .................. 53
Ring v. Ring, 834 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ....................................................................... 55
Roberts v. Diaz, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D 1548 (Fla. 3d DCA Jul y 20, 2022) ................................... 53
Robinson v. Robinson, 597 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ....................................................... 40
Robinson v. Robinson, 647 So. 2d 160 (Fla.
1st DCA 1994) ....................................................... 17
Robinson v. Robinson, 657 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)........................................................ 51
Robinson v. Robinson, 788 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ..................................................... 25
Rock v. Dept. of Revenue, 159 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) .................................................. 50
Rodolph v. Rodolph, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA June 17, 2022) .......................... 23
Rogers v. Rogers, 746 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).............................................................. 17
Ronan v. Ronan, 621 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)........................................................... 20, 49
Ronk v. Willis, 220 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) .................................................................. 45
Rose v. Rose, 8 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)........................................................................ 38
Rosen v. Rosen, 528 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)..................................................................... 11
Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997) ................................................................................. 10
Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 199 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)................................ ................ 18, 19
Roshkind v. Roshkind, 717 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).................................................. 28, 51
Roth v. Roth, 615 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) ...................................................................... 16
Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)............................................................... 7
Rubman v. Honig, 817 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)............................................................ 38
Ruiz v. Ruiz, 783 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ....................................................................... 29
Russell v. Russell, 240 So.3d 890 (Fla 1st DCA 2018)................................................................. 47
Sabine v. Sabine, 834 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)................................................................... 1
Saez-Ortiz v. Saez-Ortiz, 560 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ........................................... 14, 15
Sanchez v. Hernandez, 45 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)..................................................... 52, 55
Sasnett v. Sasnett, 683 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ............................................................... 19
69
Savery v. S avery, 670 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).............................................................. 47
Schaefer v. Schaefer, 344 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) .......................................................... 11
Schlesinger v. Emmons, 566 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)...................................................... 13
Schot v. Schot, 273 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ..................................................................... 52
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 712 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)...................................................... 44
Segnini v. Segnini, 10 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ............................................................... 46
Seith v. Seith, 337 So. 3d 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ....................................................................... 47
Selembo v. Selembo, 591 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) ......................................................... 10
Shafer v. Shafer, 777 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ............................................................... 12
Shaw v. Nelson, 4 So. 3d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)...................................................................... 46
Shierling v. Hall, 67 So. 3d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)................................................................... 60
Simonik v. Patterson, 752 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).......................................................... 60
Sjogren v. Sjogren, 309 So. 3d 669 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) .............................................................. 6
Skelly v. Skelly, 300 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) .................................................................. 30
Smithwick v. Smithwick, 343 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) ..................................................... 28
Snedaker v. Snedaker, 660 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ..................................................... 19
Snowden v. Snowden, 985 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) ........................................................ 44
Spaeth v. Spaeth, 693 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)................................................................. 31
Spaulding v. Shane, 150 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ............................................................ 60
Springstead v. Springstead, 717 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ................................................. 3
Stanley v. Stanley, 756 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).............................................................. 50
State, Dept. FIRS v. C arter, 654 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ................................................ 30
Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)........................................................... 42
Stewart v. Rich, 664 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)................................................................ 15
Stokes v. Huelsman, 770 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)........................................................... 44
Strinko v. Strinko, 225 So. 3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ............................................................... 58
Strysick v. Strysick, 673 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)............................................................ 17
Sunderwirth v. Sunderwirth, 332 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022 .............................................. 36
Swanston v. Swanston, 746 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ......................................................... 9
Szuri v. Szuri, 759 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)...................................................................... 12
Talarico v. Talarico, 305 So. 3d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)........................................................... 52
Tanner v. Tanner, 330 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) ............................................................... 23
Taylor v. Taylor, 734 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)................................................................ 36
Thomas v. Joseph, 280 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)............................................................ 56
Thompson v. Makicki, 169 So. 3d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)......................................................... 41
Thompson v. Plowmaker, 679 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).................................................... 32
Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992) ............................................................................... 43
Tinoco v. Lugo, 342 So. 3d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ................................................................... 50
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 264 So.3d 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ............................................................. 42
Todano v. Todano, 704 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)............................................................. 31
Tonnelier v. Tonnelier, 571 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)....................................................... 15
Torres v. Marzelli, 657 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ............................................................. 30
Travaglia v. Travaglia, 847 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).................................................... 50
Trice v. Trice, 267 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ..................................................................... 60
Turner v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) ............................................................... 18
Turner v. Turner, 695 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) ................................................................ 44
70
Vaccato v. Pustizzi, 648 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) .......................................................... 14
Valby v. Valby, 317 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)................................................................... 10
Vandenbosch v. Elkins, 419 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ..................................................... 40
Vargas v. Vargas, 654 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) .............................................................. 19
Veach v. Veach, 407 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) ................................................................. 13
Vega v. Swait, 961 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) .................................................................. 13
Velez v. Lafontaine, 318 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) ........................................................... 52
Vero v. Vero, 659 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) .................................................................... 32
Villalba v. Villalba, 316 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ........................................................... 56
Vincent v. Vincent, 715 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ........................................................... 35
Voorhees v. Voorhees, 204 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ................................................... 31, 48
Waldman v. Waldman, 520 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) .......................................................... 11
Walsh v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) .................................................................. 7
Walton v. Walton, 537 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)............................................................. 7, 8
Washington v. Washington, 613 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ............................................... 32
Waskin v. Waskin, 484 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ............................................................... 6
Webb v. Webb, 659 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) .................................................................... 11
Wehrum v. Wehrum, 745 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) .......................................................... 50
Weiser v. Weiser, 657 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ............................................................. 14
Wertheim v. Wertheim, 667 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)................................................. 44, 45
Wetzel v. Wetzel, 671 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ................................................................ 14
Whetstone v. Whetstone, 710 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ................................................ 3, 20
Whight v. Whight, 635 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ...................................................... 36, 44
White v. White, 3 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) .......................................................................... 1
Whitney v. Whitney, 624 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ............................................................ 39
Wiedman v. Wiedman, 610 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ....................................................... 22
Wilson v. Wilson, 585 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ....................................................... 14, 16
Winnier v. Winnier, 163 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ........................................................... 20
Withers v. Withers, 390 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) ............................................................... 3
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 953 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ..................................................................... 8
Wollschlager v. Veal, 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ......................................................... 39
Wood v. Wood, 162 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ................................................................... 41
Wood v. Wood, 590 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)................................................................. 45
Woods v. Woods, 643 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ................................................................. 28
Woodward v. Berkery, 714 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ..................................................... 33
Woolley v. Nelson, 183 So. 3d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) .............................................................. 60
Work v. Provine, 632 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) .............................................................. 40
Yangco v. Yangco, 901 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ......................................................... 15, 20
Yohem v. Yohem, 324 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) .............................................................. 14
Young v Williams, 46 FLW D2060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) ............................................................. 51
Young v. Young, 745 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ............................................................... 44
Zeballos v. Zeballos, 951 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) .......................................................... 25
Zimerle v. Zimerle, 650 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ............................................................... 3
Zipperer v. Zipperer, 567 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) .......................................................... 13
Zolonz v. Zolonz, 659 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ............................................................... 35
71
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1738B ........................................................................................................................ 33
Fla. Stat. § 47.011 ......................................................................................................................... 57
Fla. Stat. § 47.122 ......................................................................................................................... 57
Fla. Stat. § 55.501, et seq. ............................................................................................................. 32
Fla. Stat. § 55.503 ......................................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 61.08 ..................................................................................................................... 25, 26
Fla. Stat. § 61.13001 ..................................................................................................................... 58
Fla. Stat. § 743.07 ................................................................................................. 29, 30, 34, 37, 38
Fla. Stat. § 88.0011, et seq. ........................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 88.2051 ....................................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 88.2061 ......................................................................................................................... 1
Fla. Stat. § 88.3181 ......................................................................................................................... 1
Fla. Stat. § 88.6011 ....................................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 88.6111 ....................................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 88.6121 ....................................................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. § 88.6141 ....................................................................................................................... 33
